Opinion
CRIMINAL 1:21-CR-17
03-25-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. EARVIN MOTT, Defendant.
JUDGE KLEEH
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS, [ECF No. 28], BE DENIED
MICHAEL JOHN ALOI, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Presently pending before the undersigned Magistrate Judge is Defendant's Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence, [ECF No. 28], filed on January 29, 2022. By Order entered January 31, 2022, [ECF No. 29], United States District Judge Thomas S. Kleeh referred the motion to the undersigned to conduct a hearing and enter a report and recommendation as to disposition of the motion.
The undersigned is also in receipt of the Government's Response to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed on February 7, 2022. [ECF No. 30]. The undersigned conducted a hearing on Defendant's Motion on February 11, 2022, at which the Court heard witness testimony and accepted exhibits into evidence. The parties, with leave of the Court, filed supplemental briefs after said hearing. [ECF Nos. 33, 34].
Based on a detailed review of Defendant's Motion, [ECF No. 28], the Government's response, [ECF No. 30], the parties' supplemental briefs, [ECF Nos. 33, 34], the exhibits introduced into evidence at the hearing on Defendant's Motion, and the testimony provided at said hearing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion, [ECF No. 28], be DENIED as set forth herein.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant Earvin Mott (“Defendant” or “Mott”) stands accused in a three-count indictment which a Grand Jury returned against him on March 2, 2021. [ECF No. 1]. Defendant is named in the Indictment with the offenses of Possession with Intent to Distribute Fentanyl, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Offense, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and Unlawful Possession of a Firearm, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e).
On October 27, 2020, members of the Mon. Metro. Drug Task Force knocked once, identified themselves as law enforcement, then immediately, forcibly entered Room 408 of the Courtyard Marriot in Morgantown, West Virginia, a room solely registered to Earvin Mott. The purported purpose of the entry was to execute a federal arrest warrant issued for Loren Delaney (“Delaney”) associated with the “Anthony Allen wiretap” case in the Northern District of West Virginia. See Indictment, United States v. Allen, No. 1:20-CR-74, (N.D. W.Va. Oct. 10, 2020).
The federal arrest warrant issued for Loren Delaney was signed by the undersigned on October 20, 2020. See United States v. Loren Delaney, No. 1:20-CR-74-17, ECF No. 3, 51. The undersigned's authorization of the arrest warrant should not preclude him from considering this Motion to Suppress. See Compendium § 3.6-8(f), Committee on the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, (“Facts of a proceeding solely obtained by a judge in his or her judicial capacity are not personal knowledge resulting in disqualification under Canon 3C(1)(a).”).
Task force officers believed Delaney to be in the room based upon the following: task force surveillance from early October 2020 which revealed that Delaney and Mott had been residing together in a room at the Scholar Hotel; observation of Delaney's white Kia Sorento vehicle in the Courtyard Marriot Hotel parking lot on October 27, 2020, and confirmation by hotel staff on October 27, 2020 that (1) a woman matching Delaney's description was seen driving the white Kia Sorento and (2) that Mott had a room registered at the hotel.
Upon entry into Room 408, officers discovered Mott standing near the room entrance with his hands up, and Delaney, half-asleep on the bed. Officers also observed, in plain view, marijuana, a loaded syringe and packaging materials. Task force officer Zachary Cooper sought and obtained a search warrant in the magistrate court of Monongalia County, West Virginia to conduct a further search of the hotel room. During the subsequent search, officers discovered and seized a large quantity of fentanyl, approximately 200 grams, two firearms, and approximately $13,000 in United States currency.
II. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY AND OTHER EVIDENCE
At the aforementioned suppression hearing on February 11, 2022, the Court heard sworn testimony from one witness, namely: (1) Zachary Cooper of the West Virginia State Police and the Mon. Metro Drug Task Force.
The Court also received into evidence the following: (1) Government's Exhibit #1, October 27, 2020 Search Warrant and Affidavit for Marriott Hotel Room 408 and Vehicles, [ECF No. 32-1]; (2) Government's Exhibit #2, October 5, 2020, Search Warrant and Affidavit regarding The Scholar Hotel Morgantown Room 203, [ECF No. 32-2]; (3) Government's Exhibit #3, Search Warrant and Affidavit regarding The Scholar Hotel Morgantown Room 203, including trash and locked safes, [ECF No. 32-3]; (4) Defendant's Exhibit #1, Report of Investigation prepared by Special Agent Matthew H. Bassett, [ECF No. 32-12]; (5) Government's Exhibit #5, Criminal Complaint as to Loren Delaney - Possession with Intent to Deliver Fentanyl, [ECF No. 32-4]; (6) Government's Exhibit #6, Criminal Complaint as to Loren Delaney - Conspiracy, [ECF No. 32-5]; (7) Government's Exhibit #7, Criminal Complaint as to Loren Delaney - Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, [ECF No. 32-6]; (8) Government's Exhibit #8, Criminal Complaint as to Loren Delaney - Possession with Intent to Deliver Methamphetamine, [ECF No. 32-7]; (9) Government's Exhibit #9, Criminal Complaint as to Loren Delaney - Possession with Intent to Deliver Heroin, [ECF No. 32-8]; (10) Government's Exhibit #10, September 2, 2020 Arrest Warrant for Loren Delaney, Magistrate Court of Monongalia County, West Virginia, [ECF No. 32-9]; (11) Government's Exhibit #11, October 29, 2020 Primary Report by Zac Cooper, Search Warrant Courtyard Marriott, [ECF No. 32-10]; and Government's Exhibit #12, October 13, 2020 Primary Report by Zachary Cooper, Search Warrant Scholar Hotel, [ECF No. 32-11].
There is no Government's Exhibit #4; the exhibit originally considered Government's Exhibit #4 was ultimately labelled and admitted as Defendant's Exhibit #1.
(1) Testimony of Task Force Officer Zachary Cooper
According to the testimony of Task Force Officer Zachary “Zac” Cooper (“TFO Cooper”) of the West Virginia State Police and the Mon. Metro Drug Task Force, on October 5, 2020, Mon. Metro Drug Task Force members were looking to arrest suspect Loren Delaney (“Delaney”) who had active arrest warrants issued by a magistrate judge in Monongalia County pursuant to the filing of five criminal complaints. [9:01:48-9:02:11; 9:13:24-9:15:39]. The task force received information that Delaney was staying at Scholar Hotel in downtown Morgantown, West Virginia with Defendant Earvin Mott (“Mott”). [9:02:12-9:02:24; 9:04:21-9:04:30]. Staff members for the Scholar Hotel provided a portion of hotel video footage to the task force; task force officers observed Loren Delaney on the video surveillance with a black male, who was later determined to be Mott. [9:02:25-9:03:33; 9:17:15-9:17:33]. Officers discovered Delaney was driving a white Kia sedan which was registered in her name. [9:03:53-9:04:15]. Hotel staff initially advised they had observed her vehicle nearby. [9:04:31-9:04:43].
The citations here to times in brackets correspond to the times of the Court's archived audio recording of the suppression hearing on February 11, 2022, which is located on the section of the Court's intranet site for FTR recordings.
TFO Cooper has been with the Mon. Metro Drug Task Force since February 2020 and has been a member of the West Virginia State Police since November 2011. [9:01:27-9:01:48].
See Government's Exhibits Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, [ECF Nos. 32-5, 32-6, 32-7, 32-8, and 32-9].
Task force officers were hopeful that they could execute the arrest warrants on Loren Delaney on October 5, 2020, at the Scholar Hotel. [9:03:34-9:03:52]. However, Delaney was not ultimately arrested on this date because when officers went to do surveillance, Delaney's vehicle was no longer parked in the parking garage or near Scholar Hotel. [9:04:16-09:04:20; 9:04:44-9:04:50]. Hotel staff advised officers that the hotel had video footage of Delaney and Mott leaving their room, placing trash in a receptacle in the outside hallway on the same floor, and then leaving the hotel. [9:04:51-9:05:13]. Officers watched the video footage, observed the trash receptacle to ensure no other trash was placed inside, and then an officer pulled the trash bag and performed a search. The trash receptacle yielded evidence of the narcotics sales and distribution. [9:05:14-9:05:47].
Because Delaney and Mott had left the hotel and because Delaney's car was no longer nearby, with the information gained from the trash pull, officer sought and obtained a search warrant in the hopes that they could search the room. [9:05:48-9:06:09]. However, the search warrant was never executed as Delaney and Mott never returned to the hotel room. [9:06:10-9:06:18].
See Government's Exhibits 2 and 3, [ECF Nos. 32-2 and 32-3].
On October 27, 2020, TFO Cooper and other officers from numerous law enforcement agencies were participating in a “round up, ” or mass arrest and surveillance, of individuals indicted in “the Anthony Allen” case in the Northern District, 1:20-cr-74. Delaney was one of individuals indicted who was a target of the round up. [09:06:19-09:07:13].
Task force officers discovered that Delaney's white Kia Sorento was parked at the Courtyard by Marriot. [09:07:14-09:07:40; 9:07:57-9:08:01]. Task force officers were specifically searching hotel parking lots for evidence of Delaney's presence based on collective task force knowledge of Delaney's past practice of residing in hotels and using hotel rooms as a location to exchange sexual services for illegal substances. [09:07:41-9:07:56; 9:17:34-9:18:36].
After officers observed Delaney's vehicle at the Marriot hotel, one officer remained with the vehicle while another office spoke with hotel staff. [9:07:57-9:08:15]. The officer gave a hotel staff member a description of Delaney and the hotel staff member confirmed that Delaney was driving the white Kia vehicle parked outside. [9:08:16-9:08:36; 9:08:43-9:08:50]. The officer then asked if Mott currently had a hotel room at the Marriot. [9:08:37-9:08:42]. The officer asked this based upon the prior intelligence regarding Mott and Delaney's stay at the Scholar Hotel. Marriot staff confirmed that Mott did have a hotel room, Room 408. [9:08:43-9:09:10].
Officers had previously run an NCIC search on Mott which revealed that he had a dangerous criminal history, including a charge for “Literal Murder.” [9:09:11-9:09:27; 9:13:25-9:14:49]. After receiving confirmation that Mott had a room at the hotel, task force officers converged on the hotel to cover all points of egress then made entry into the room in order to arrest Delaney. [9:09:28-9:09:44]. It was approximately 1:00 p.m. Upon entry, officers observed, Mott coming towards officers with hands up and Delaney on the hotel bed half-asleep. [9:09:45-9:09:56; 9:36:36-9:37]. Officers observed, in plain view, marijuana, a loaded syringe and packaging materials. [9:09:57-9:11:57]. A written search warrant was then obtained by TFO Cooper for the Marriot Courtyard Room 408, the White Kia, and a red Jeep. [9:11:58-9:12:55]. See Government's Exhibit 1, [ECF No. 32-1].
“NCIC” refers to the National Crime Information Center computerized tracking database used for the rapid exchange of information between criminal justice agencies.
After the search warrant was obtained, it was executed upon the hotel room. Officers recovered a large amount of a substance later revealed to be fentanyl, as tested by the West Virginia State Police Lab, two firearms, and a large sum of cash. [9:12:56-9:13:24].
On cross-examination, TFO Cooper testified that Earvin Mott was not listed as a co-conspirator or co-defendant on any charges for Delaney's arrest warrants. [9:15:30-9:15:32]. TFO Cooper testified Loren Delaney was not listed or registered with the hotel as a room occupant. [9:15:54-9:16:24]. TFO Cooper testified that the October 5, 2020 search warrant was signed by a Monongalia County magistrate, but TFO Cooper could not remember precisely which magistrate. [9:16:25-9:17:14].
TFO Cooper testified that on October 4, 2020, prior to TFO Cooper's obtaining of a search warrant for the room at the Scholar Hotel, Loren Delaney arrived at the front desk of the Scholar Hotel and requested that Room 203 be extended until October 10, 2020. Room 203 was the room registered and rented by Earvin Mott. The front desk staff of the Scholar Hotel relayed this information to TFO Mark Trump. [09:19:01-9:19:49].
TFO Cooper testified that when he returned with the search warrant for the Scholar Hotel room, Delaney and Mott had exited the building. Officers believe the last time they were in the hotel was when they placed items into the trash then exited the building. [9:24:10-9:24:50].
TFO Cooper testified that on October 27, 2020, another member of the task force, Lieutenant Forbes, is the one who spoke with the clerk and advised that he provided a detailed description of Loren Delaney to the Marriot hotel clerk. No. photograph was provided. TFO Cooper was uncertain of what that detailed description was. [9:25:04-9:25:40; 9:38:57-9:39:15]. TFO Cooper was also uncertain how many rooms were at the Courtyard Marriot Hotel and how many occupants might meet Delaney or Mott's descriptions. [9:25:41-9:26:18].
TFO Cooper testified that on October 27, 2020 the task force had no arrest warrants or search warrants for Mott. [9:26:18-9:26:41]. TFO Cooper further testified that the Marriot hotel room was solely registered to Mott and had no registration notes reflected other occupants. [9:26:42-9:27:10]. TFO Cooper testified Delaney was not registered at any room in that hotel on October 27, 2020. [9:27:11-9:27:49].
TFO Cooper testified that during the time in between the October 5, 2020 hotel stay and October 27, 2020 arrest warrant execution, task force members took steps to locate Delaney by searching for her vehicle in hotel parking lots. [9:27:50-9:28:08]. TFO Cooper testified that no search warrant was secured prior to entry of the Marriot hotel room on October 27, 2020. [9:28:09-9:28:42]. TFO Cooper testified there was no illegal conduct or suspicious activity associated with Room 408 prior to entry on October 27, 2020. [9:28:43-9:28:52]. When asked why he did not wait to secure a search warrant, TFO Cooper testified he did not believe a search warrant was needed because Delaney's vehicle was there on-site, and they had probable cause to believe a wanted fugitive with an arrest warrant was inside Room 408. [9:28:53-9:30:05].
TFO Cooper further testified that there were no “no-knock” arrest warrants issued. [9:30:06-9:30:49]. TFO Cooper testified he could not remember the exact methods used for entering the hotel room, but he believes the locks were broken, and it was a forcible entry. [9:35:10-9:35:46]. TFO Cooper testified officers did knock on the door and identified themselves as law enforcement, but no officers asked if Delaney was present or if Delaney could make herself available in the hallway. [9:35:47-9:36:02; 9:38:00-9:38:07]. TFO Cooper testified no officers confirmed Delany's presence in the room or hotel prior to entry. [9:30:08-9:38:25]. TFO Cooper testified he could not remember the amount of time that had elapsed between the knock on the door and entry into Room 408. [9:36:03-9:36:27]. TFO Cooper testified there was no consent to enter given either by Delaney or Mott. [9:36:28-9:36:36]. TFO Cooper testified more than five officers made entry into the room. [9:37:17-9:37:41]. TFO Cooper testified Mott was not given Miranda warnings upon entry. [9:37:42-9:37:59].
On redirect examination, TFO Cooper testified that on October 27, 2020, no criminal conduct was associated with the hotel room which would justify a search warrant prior to entry and the sole basis of the surveillance and investigation on that day was to arrest Delaney as part of the federal round up. [9:39:52-9:40:49].
III. LEGAL ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
Defendant contends, in his motion, that (1) the forcible entry absent a search warrant, absent an announcement, and absent law enforcement identification was in violation of Mott's constitutional rights; (2) the execution of the arrest warrant was pretext for searching Mott's hotel room; and (3) no Miranda warnings were given to Mott during the encounter.
During the motion hearing, defense counsel additionally argued that the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Brinkley, 980 F.3d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 2020), holds that entries into third-party residences deserve the highest level of scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. Defense counsel argued there was not strong verification that Delaney was present in Room 408, and the officers should have conducted further surveillance or obtained a search warrant for entry of the room instead of or before forcible entry into the room. Defense counsel argued officers executed the arrest warrant in this manner as a pretext to get into the room of Defendant Mott. Defense counsel additionally argued the fact that Delaney was eventually found inside the room cannot and should not color the validity of the entry. Defense counsel emphasized that in this instance, there were no exigent circumstances, like “hot pursuit, ” or consent which justified entry into the hotel room.
In his supplemental brief, filed on February 17, 2022, Defendant contends no actions were taken to confirm Delaney's presence and argues the arrest warrant was pretext to enter the room. Defendant argues there was insufficient probable cause to support a search warrant for Mott's room in search of Delaney and insufficient probable cause to conduct a forcible entry. Additionally, Defendant argues that the subsequently-obtained search warrant cannot be saved by good faith and, in support, cites to a prior opinion of this Court. [ECF No. 33 at 5 (citing United States v. Harvey, 901 F.Supp.2d 681, 696 (N.D. W.Va. 2012))].
On the contrary, the Government argues that the fact that the room was in Defendant Mott's name does not invalidate a lawfully issued arrest warrant executed on a dwelling after obtaining probable cause that Delaney was inside. The Government also argues that evidence seized during execution of the search warrant should nonetheless be upheld as officers were not dishonest or reckless in their actions.
In oral arguments at the motion hearing, the Government, by Assistant United States Attorney Wesley, argued that officers' prior investigation gave probable cause, or reasonable belief, that Delaney would be found inside the room. Specifically, the Government argued that officers had knowledge that Delaney owned and operated a white Kia Sorento and that her associate Mott had a room inside the hotel where she was parked. Furthermore, the Government argued the manner of entry into the hotel room is not an issue, particularly where officers understood Mott to be inside and where Mott had a violent criminal history. The Government argued the Brinkley case is easily distinguished from this case. The Government further argued that under the principles of Leon, this Court should not suppress evidence where officers obtained a search warrant, did not act recklessly or dishonestly in obtaining the search warrant, and acted in good faith based upon the written warrant.
In a supplement brief filed on February 18, 2022, the Government argues that officers clearly had probable cause to enter the hotel room to search for Delaney based upon the officers' surveillance of Delaney and Mott in early October 2020 which established a pattern of behavior that was likewise observed on the date of entry into the hotel room, and which indicated that Delaney would be located inside the room. [ECF No. 34 at 3-4].
A. Legal Principles
As a foundational matter, the undersigned notes the well-established principle that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The “cardinal principle” is “that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). It is generally the Government's burden to demonstrate that one of these exceptions applies. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
Also well-established is the exclusionary rule - that a court should exclude evidence obtained by dint of law enforcement's unlawful arrest or search. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Relatedly, however, a court should suppress evidence in a criminal matter “only … where its deterrence benefits of exclusion outweigh its substantial social costs.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (citations and quotations omitted).
B. Analysis
The issues here require the following sequential analysis: (1) whether officers' entrance into the hotel room was supported by probable cause or was otherwise constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment; (2) whether the evidence seized is nonetheless permissible where a search warrant was obtained, and officers relied upon the search warrant; and (3) whether the failure to provide Miranda warnings justifies the suppression of physical evidence.
(1) Entrance into the Hotel Room
“[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). However, an arrest warrant alone does not authorize police to enter a third party's home. United States v. Brinkley, 980 F.3d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 216). In a third-party residence situation, "two distinct interests" protected by the Fourth Amendment are at stake: not only "[the suspect's] interest in being free from an unreasonable seizure," but also "[the third party's] interest in being free from an unreasonable search." Id. While an arrest warrant may adequately protect the former interest, it does "absolutely nothing to protect [the third party's] privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable invasion and search of his home." Id. (citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213).
Accordingly, “when officers armed with an arrest warrant seek to apprehend the suspect in a third party's home, Steagald, not Payton, controls, and requires police to obtain a search warrant founded on probable cause in order to enter the home.” Brinkley, 980 F.3d at 385. Whereas “Payton controls when officers believe that the suspect resides in a certain home, even if they are mistaken.” Id. When police seek to enter a home and are uncertain whether the suspect resides there, courts must interpret the “reasonable belief standard to be that of a “probable cause” requirement; before entering an apartment without a search warrant, police must have probable cause to believe that the suspect resides therein and will be present when police enter. Brinkley, 980 F.3d at 386.
Courts must “consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing probable cause.” Id. (citing Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013)). “The ‘quantity and quality' of information known to officers bear on whether they have probable cause, with less reliable information requiring more corroboration.” Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
In Brinkley, 980 F.3d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 2020), the Fourth Circuit held that an entry to execute an arrest warrant was unlawful where officers (1) lacked probable cause that a suspect resided at a certain apartment and (2) failed to establish probable cause that the suspect would be present in the apartment when they entered. Officers in Brinkley had information which linked the target to numerous addresses. Officers, almost arbitrarily, decided to begin their attempted execution of the arrest warrant at one residence, an apartment associated with the target as reported by some entries in a law enforcement database, but officers “intended to check the[ ] other addresses if [the suspect] was not found at the . . . apartment.” Brinkley, 980 F.3d at 381. Further, officer testimony acknowledged that officers “had no idea if [the suspect] as going to be that morning[.]” Id. Ultimately, where “officers entered the apartment pursuant solely to the authority of the arrest warrant, ” and without probable cause as required under Payton and its progeny, the entry was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. Brinkley, 980 F.3d at 389.
Relevant to the instant case, guests in hotel rooms are also entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy and Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, comparable to that of a home residence. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964). The Fourth Circuit has specifically held that Payton arrest warrant requirements apply to guest rooms in commercial establishments, such as hotels. United States v. McCraw 920 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 546 (4th Cir. 2005)(“[T]he protection of a house extends to apartments, rented rooms within a house, and hotel rooms so that a landlord may not give the police consent to a warrantless search of a rented apartment or room.”); United States v. Forker, 928 F.2d 365, 370 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[A] person does not forfeit Fourth Amendment protections merely because he is residing in a motel room.”).
The Fourth Circuit has not expressly considered, post-Brinkley, what evidence supports probable cause that a suspect would be residing within a hotel room and would be present when law enforcement entered. However, in two recent cases, the Eleventh Circuit has held that law enforcement officers were authorized under the Fourth Amendment to enter a hotel and execute an arrest warrant where officers had reasonable belief that the hotel room was the suspect's dwelling at the time of entry and the suspect would be found inside. See United States v. Mastin, 972 F.3d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1237 (2021); United States v. Ross, 964 F.3d 1034, 1041 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1394, 209 L.Ed.2d 132 (2021).
Notably, in Mastin, the Eleventh Circuit held officers had “plenty of support” to enter a hotel room to execute two arrest warrants even though the hotel room was not registered in either suspect's name. Mastin, 972 F.3d at 1236-37. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit assessed:
[Law enforcement] believed the two men were “running together” because of an ongoing dispute with another gang. Neither man was likely to rent a hotel room in his own name - they were wanted for armed robbery . . . But the fugitive task force knew that [the suspect's] girlfriend-had rented a room under her name. And they knew that she had rented that room with another individual present. It was not a leap for the task force to believe that she likely rented the room on behalf of [the suspect]. The facts also show that law enforcement reasonably believed that [the suspects were] inside the hotel room. After surveilling the premises, the task force knew that six other individuals, including two that matched [the suspects'] description[s], had entered the hotel. Of course, some of those individuals later left the hotel-which is exactly why the task force split into two teams. But the team that remained at the hotel did so under the reasonable belief that either [suspect] had remained behind.Id.
In Ross, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that “[o]fficers need not be ‘absolutely certain' that a suspect is inside before entering ‘to execute an arrest warrant.'” Ross, 964 F.3d at 1041 (quoting United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1538 (11th Cir. 1995)). But rather, law enforcement should “make reasonable inferences and presumptions based on the time of day or observations at the scene”-for instance, “that a person is [there] when his vehicle is parked outside.” Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 871 F.3d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 2017). In Ross, the Eleventh Circuit found that the continued presence of a suspect's truck in a motel parking lot, after law enforcement pursued the suspect on foot but eventually lost sight of him, lead to a strong likelihood that the suspect had returned to his acquaintance's hotel room and could be found in his acquaintance's hotel room. The Eleventh Circuit ultimately concluded that officers had authority under the Fourth Amendment to enter the hotel room based upon the vehicle's continued presence in the motel parking lot in combination with the valid arrest warrant.
Here, unlike Brinkley, there was ample probable cause to authorize task force officers' entry into the Marriot hotel room to execute the arrest warrant on Delaney. Officers Mon. Metro Drug Task Force officers had video evidence that Delaney and Mott dwelled together in a hotel room earlier in the month and that in the past, the hotel was registered in Mott's name, but was used as a dwelling by both Mott and Delaney. Officers also had knowledge of Delaney's history of residing in hotel rooms with male associates, exchanging sexual services for illegal controlled substances. Officers knew Delaney owned and operated a white Kia Sorento and that this same vehicle was parked in the Marriot hotel's parking lot on October 27, 2020, the day of the arrest and entry into Room 408. Officers interviewed hotel staff and discovered that Mott had a room registered at the hotel and a woman matching Delaney was driving the vehicle which was parked in the hotel parking lot.
Based on the presence of Delaney's vehicle at the hotel, Mott's hotel room registration, and prior knowledge acquired from surveillance that Delaney and Mott had been recently residing together in hotels, officers had probable cause that (1) Delaney would be residing inside the Marriot hotel room, and (2) that Delaney could be found inside at that time.
The undersigned would note that the hotel, a Courtyard by Marriott located at 460 Courtyard St, Morgantown, West Virginia 26501, has a private parking lot and is located within the University Towne Centre, a commercial area in Morgantown, West Virginia. This area has limited foot traffic and if primarily accessed by car.
Again, under these facts, Fourth Circuit precedent does not require absolute certainty from law enforcement officers, nor does it require that law enforcement officers stop their efforts to execute an arrest warrant and obtain a search warrant prior to entry of a hotel room. Rather, law enforcement officers must have probable cause, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the hotel room was the suspect's dwelling at the time of entry and the suspect would be found inside. Despite Defendant Mott's arguments focusing on the fact that the hotel room was solely registered in his name, evidence and testimony supports that Delaney was likewise dwelling or residing in that hotel room and that hotel rooms had, in essence, been serving as a shared residence for the pair throughout the month.
The undersigned FINDS that task force officers had authority to enter the hotel room to execute Delaney's arrest warrant and did not violate the Defendant Mott's Fourth Amendment rights in doing so where officers had probable cause, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the hotel room was also Delaney's dwelling, and that Delaney would be found therein. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Defendant's Motion to Suppress be DENIED.
(2) Search Warrant Validity under Leon
The undersigned previously found that the entry into Mott's hotel room was permissible under the Fourth Amendment based upon a valid arrest warrant for Delaney and the officers' probable cause that Delaney would be found inside. Upon entry into the hotel room, officers viewed marijuana, a loaded syringe and packaging materials consistent with the distribution of controlled substances in plain view. Officers subsequently obtained a search warrant to further search the room, which lead to the seizure of fentanyl and firearms and Mott's indictment in this case.
The Leon good faith exception can serve to salvage an otherwise defective warrant. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court held the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule does not bar the admission of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant which was issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid. Id. See also United States v. Edwards, 798 F.2d 686, 690 (4th Cir. 1986). “Leon teaches that a court should not suppress the fruits of a search conducted under the authority of a warrant, even a ‘subsequently invalidated' warrant, unless ‘a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization.'” United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir.2002).
In other words, “[u]nder the good faith exception, evidence obtained from an invalidated search warrant will be suppressed only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.” United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1278 (4th Cir. 1993).
Here, the undersigned is of the opinion that the evidence seized should not be suppressed where officers acted in good faith, in objectively reasonable reliance on the search warrant which had been authorized by a detached and neutral Monongalia County magistrate. See Government Exhibit 1, [ECF No. 32-1]. The Government argues that “ [r]eliance upon an arrest warrant and then a written search warrant is the epitome of reasonable” action by officers. [ECF No. 34 at 5]. The undersigned is inclined to agree. Leon advises this Court not to exclude the fruits of a search conducted under authority of a search warrant.
The Defendant argues this Court should follow its analysis in the prior case of United States v. Harvey, 901 F.Supp.2d 681, 696 (N.D. W.Va. 2012). However, here, unlike in Harvey, the undersigned has found that officers' entry into the hotel room was lawful. Even if this search warrant were to subsequently found invalid, where entry into the hotel room was lawful and there is no evidence that task force officers acted dishonestly, recklessness or without obj ective probable cause, the Leon good-faith exception supports the search warrant's execution and seizure of evidence.
(3) Failure to Provide Miranda Warnings
Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Thus, Miranda warnings are required when a subject is interrogated while in custody. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
In his motion, Defendant alleges he was not provided Miranda warning by task force officers who entered the hotel room on October 27, 2020. Defendant, however, does not allege he was questioned or subject to interrogation without Miranda warnings in violation of the Fifth Amendment, nor does Defendant seek to suppress any incriminating statements made while he was in custody. Thus, the undersigned, without more than a passing complaint by the Defendant regarding officers' failure to provide Miranda warning, FINDS no violation of Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.
The undersigned would also note for parties that the “fruits doctrine” is inapplicable to Miranda violations, such that physical evidence recovered pursuant to voluntary un-Mirandized statements generally will not be suppressed. United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 218-219 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 931 (2002).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion to Suppress, [ECF No. 28], be DENIED.
Any party may within seven (7) days file with the Clerk of this Court, specific written objections, identifying the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis of such objection. A copy of such objections should also be submitted to the United States District Judge. Objections shall not exceed ten (10) typewritten pages or twenty (20) handwritten pages, including exhibits, unless accompanied by a motion for leave to exceed the page limitations, consistent with LR PL P 12.
Although parties usually have fourteen (14) days to respond to a Report and Recommendation such as this, that is a maximum time to respond, not a minimum. In this matter, the pretrial conference is scheduled for March 11, 2022, and the jury selection and trial for March 29, 2022.
Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to transmit copies of this Report and Recommendation to counsel of record as provided in the Administrative Procedures for Electronic Case Filing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.