In the good-faith-exception context, officers cannot reasonably rely on a warrant based upon a “bare-bones” affidavit. See United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2022). The former looks to the legal instrument itself, the latter looks to law enforcement's reliance on the instrument.
Thus, “[e]vidence should not be suppressed when law enforcement obtained it in good-faith reliance on a warrant.” United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 335 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 897).
As a general matter, David's averments are more germane to attacking "the probable-cause determination itself" than to showing the applicability of the bare-bones cutout. United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 338 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc). In other words, his contentions—even if taken at face value—would not show that the affidavits were "bare bones."
“[O]n close calls second guessing the issuing judge is not a basis for excluding evidence.” United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2022).
” Allen, 625 F.3d at 835. “A warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting a search.” United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S.Ct. 2467, 216 L.Ed.2d 435 (2023) (hereafter referred to as “Morton II”).
The good faith exception would not apply if any one of Siegert's allegations is true. See United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc). Here, however, the good faith exception applies because the affidavit did not contain a false statement made intentionally or with reckless disregard for its truth, the warrant was not deficient in particularizing the place to be searched, and the warrant was not so lacking in probable cause as to render belief in its existence unreasonable.
This exception does not apply, however, if: (1) the issuing judge was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew or should have known was false; (2) the issuing judge abandoned his impartial judicial role; (3) the affidavit supporting the warrant so lacks indicia of probable cause that reliance on it is entirely unreasonable; or (4) the warrant on its face is so deficient in identifying the place to be searched or the things to be seized that it cannot reasonably be presumed valid. United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2022).
Instead, it provided specific facts and circumstances that allowed the issuing judge to make a probable-cause determination regarding the search of the cellphone. See United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 336-38 (5th Cir. 2022). The totality of the circumstances confirm that the affidavit is not bare bones.
An affidavit lacks indicia of probable cause, and thereby defeats the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, when it is "wholly conclusory" and "do[es] not detail any facts" but instead "allege[s] only conclusions." United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 337 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (emphasis added), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 9, 2023) (No. 22-6489). If the affidavit contains enough factual information to allow the judge to "ma[k]e a judgment call," then it is "reasonable" for an officer to "rely on the warrant[]."
“Bare bones” affidavits contain wholly conclusory statements, which lack the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently determine probable cause. United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 336-37 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1992)). Bare bone affidavits typically contain statements like “the affiant has cause to suspect and does believe” or “the affiant received information from a credible person and does believe.”