United States v. Montez

21 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Vesey

    966 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2020)   Cited 8 times

    We employ the categorical approach to determine whether an offense is a crime of violence for Guidelines purposes. See, e.g. , United States v. Montez , 858 F.3d 1085, 1092 (7th Cir. 2017) ; see also United States v. Taylor , 630 F.3d 629, 633 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that courts apply the categorical approach to the Armed Career Criminal Act and the Guidelines in the same manner). That is, we consider whether the elements of the offense match the definition of a crime of violence without looking to the specific underlying facts of the conviction.

  2. United States v. Coleman

    2:18-CR-101 JD (N.D. Ind. Jul. 21, 2022)

    “Under the framework of Mathis v. United States, (2016), the principal question is whether the statute under which the defendant was convicted is ‘divisible' or ‘indivisible.'” United States v. Montez, 858 F.3d 1085, 1092 (7th Cir. 2017). When the statute is indivisible, the Court lines up the crime's elements alongside with the definition of the crime of violence to see if they match.

  3. United States v. Montez

    No. 18 CV 4780 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2019)

    At Montez's four-day trial, his strategy was "to cast himself as a user of the drugs, rather than a distributor." United States v. Montez, 858 F.3d 1085, 1088 (7th Cir. 2017). The jury convicted him of the December 2011 count but acquitted him of the other two counts.

  4. United States v. Ramirez

    Case No. 17-cv-5749 (N.D. Ill. May. 14, 2018)

    "Although Mathis was an Armed Career Criminal Act case, courts have observed that the approaches used to apply the career-offender enhancement and the Armed Career Criminal Act are similar and thus that Mathis is controlling in a Guidelines case." United States v. Montez, 858 F.3d 1085, 1092 n.3 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569, 574 (5th Cir. 2016)). Petitioner also argues that his conviction for armed violence should not be considered a crime of violence.

  5. United States v. Shaffers

    22 F.4th 655 (7th Cir. 2022)   Cited 15 times

    A conviction under the first clause—for causing bodily harm—has as an element "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force" and thus is a crime of violence, while a conviction under the second clause does not. Id. ; see also United States v. Montez , 858 F.3d 1085, 1092 (7th Cir. 2017). The district court here turned to the Shepard documents to determine which prong of the battery statute formed the basis of Shaffers' 2008 conviction.

  6. United States v. Falls

    No. 19-3050 (7th Cir. May. 26, 2020)   Cited 14 times

    The government responds that the interviewing officer's statement of the date of the interview was offered not for its truth but for context as to what Falls meant when he later spoke about his illegal activities taking place "today." See United States v. Montez, 858 F.3d 1085, 1089-90 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that statement offered to make sense of another party's admission is not hearsay if not offered for its truth). Falls maintains that the statement about the date was nevertheless hearsay because it was relevant only if true.

  7. United States v. Johnson

    No. 17-1274 (7th Cir. Feb. 14, 2018)

    He argued that the second was not a violent felony, in part, because the Illinois aggravated battery statute (formerly 720 ILCS 5/12-4 but now 5/12-3.05) is indivisible and thus not subject to the modified-categorical approach to determining whether the crime is a "violent felony" for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. As counsel correctly notes, however, this court recently rejected that precise argument in the context of the sentencing guidelines, which we interpret the same way. See United States v. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 797 (7th Cir. 2017) (career offender guideline); United States v. Montez, 858 F.3d 1085, 1092 (7th Cir. 2017), pet. for cert. filed (Dec. 15, 2017) (same); see also Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2012) (ACCA); United States v. Rodriguez-Gomez, 608 F.3d 969, 973-74 (7th Cir. 2010) (U.S.S.G.§ 2L1.2). We agree with counsel that it would be frivolous for Johnson to argue that aggravated battery of a peace officer is not a violent felony.

  8. United States v. Gamez

    2:19-CR-114 JD (N.D. Ind. Jan. 7, 2025)

    the categorical approach to determine whether an offense is a crime of violence for Guidelines purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Montez, 858 F.3d 1085, 1092 (7th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Taylor, 630 F.3d 629, 633 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that courts apply the categorical approach to the Armed Career Criminal Act and the Guidelines in the same manner). That is, we consider whether the elements of the offense match the definition of a crime of violence without looking to the specific underlying facts of the conviction.

  9. Elion v. United States

    3:17-cv-01349-JPG (S.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2024)

    Sentencing courts apply a “categorical approach” to determine whether a prior conviction is a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-01 (1990); United States v. Montez, 858 F.3d 1085, 1096 n.3 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that Mathis-Taylor's progeny-applies to career-offender cases).

  10. Rubini v. Greene

    24 CV 1943 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 30, 2024)

    Even if Rubini had not procedurally defaulted, this claim fails on the merits because the trial jury's guilty verdict renders harmless any possible error in the grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Montez, 858 F.3d 1085, 1091 (7th Cir. 2017) (a trial jury's guilty verdict renders an error in the grand jury proceedings harmless); Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 442 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding a grand jury irregularity harmless because “[t]he conviction proves that there was probable cause to try” the habeas petitioner). A court may excuse the procedural default and reach the merits of a petitioner's claim only if he demonstrates either: (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice or (2) that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.