Opinion
No. 2:18-cr-00170-JAM
11-18-2020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DAVID MCDANIELS, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
The matter before the Court is Defendant David McDaniels' Motion to Suppress. Mot. to Suppress ("Mot."), ECF No. 27. Defendant moves to suppress all tangible and intangible evidence obtained during the May 22, 2018, search of the motel room he alleges to have temporarily stayed in. Mot. at 2-3. The Government has responded in opposition, Opp'n, ECF No. 39, to which Defendant has replied, Reply, ECF No. 40. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 22, 2018, Vacaville Police Officer Spencer, stopped Angelika Riggins in her car in a Motel 6 parking lot. Vacaville Police Department Officer's Report Narrative ("Officer's Report") at 1, ECF No. 27-2. Riggins' car registration was expired. Id. Officer Spencer conducted a records check on Riggins and discovered that she was on probation in Solano County. Id. Riggins' terms of probation required her to submit her "person, real or personal property, automobile and any object under [her] control to search and seizure . . . at any time day or night, with or without cause, notice, consent or warrant." Id. at 1-2. Riggins told Officer Spencer that she was staying in Room 129 of the motel alone, but the room was in her stepsister's name, Crystal Morales, because she did not have personal identification to book a motel room herself. Id. at 2; see also Spencer Body Camera Footage at 4:10-4:50.
Officer Spencer then decided to search Riggins' car, where he and another officer discovered several debit, credit, and identification cards belonging to other people. Officer's Report at 2. The officers suspected identity theft. Id. The officers also located Riggins' Motel 6 room key. Id. Using her room key, Officer Boehm confirmed with the motel staff that it belonged to Room 129. Id. Officer Spencer decided to conduct a follow-up probation search of Riggins' motel room. Id. Officer Spencer knocked on the motel room door and announced, "police department probation search, open the door." Officer's Report at 2. Officer Spencer heard someone approach the door and ask who was there, at which point Officer Spencer reidentified himself and restated his order. Id. After several more knocks, and a failed attempt to open the door with the room key, Defendant eventually undid the deadbolt and opened the door. Id.
Defendant was immediately put into handcuffs by another officer. Id. Officer Spencer and Officer Criste entered the room. Id. Two other people were inside. Officer's Report at 2. They were also handcuffed and taken outside. Id. Officer Boehm began searching the room and found a loaded semi-automatic handgun in an air conditioning vent near the bathroom. Id. at 3. The officers also found documents, mail, and personal identifying information of several different people who were not present in the motel room. Id. Officer Spencer then interviewed Defendant and the two other people who were in the room with him. Id. at 3-4. Each was, in turn, questioned about the handgun and the personal identifying information. Officer's Report at 3-4.
Following these interviews, Officer Spencer placed Defendant under arrest for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, pursuant to California Penal Code § 29800(a). Id. at 4. On August 30, 2018, Defendant was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See Indictment, ECF No. 3.
II. OPINION
Defendant moves to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of the motel room and his seizure on the grounds that he (1) has standing to challenge the search as an overnight guest of the motel room; and (2) the search and seizure were warrantless and, thus, presumptively illegal. Mot. at 7-12. The Government argues that (1) Defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of the motel room; (2) the warrantless search of the motel room was valid as a probation search; and (3) the search was justified by exigent circumstances. Opp'n at 4-19.
A. Legal Standard
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the Government. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). However, a defendant must have standing in order to challenge the constitutionality of a search. In the Fourth Amendment context, this means that a defendant "must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search." Byrd v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018). This interest is often described as a "legitimate expectation of privacy." United States v. Armenta, 69 F.3d 304, 308 (9th Cir. 1995). "To demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy, [a defendant] must show that he has an actual subjective expectation of privacy in the [place searched], and that society is prepared to recognize that expectation. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
This is because the Fourth Amendment only protects those "against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else." Lyall v. City of L.A., 807 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, "an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not." Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). The defendant has the burden of "demonstrat[ing] that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy giving rise to Fourth Amendment protection. United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005).
B. Analysis
Defendant argues he has standing to challenge the search of the motel room because he had been an overnight guest in the room for two days and was free to come and go as he pleased. See Mot. at 7; see also Def.'s Decl. at 1, ECF No. 27-3. The evidence presented in support of this is Defendant's own statement that he was an overnight guest and the fact that he had just exited the shower at the time the officers entered the room. Id. The Government argues this evidence is insufficient to support Fourth Amendment standing. The Court agrees.
A defendant must present sufficient evidence to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. See Armenta, 69 F.3d at 309. For instance, in Armenta, the defendant presented: (1) his own sworn declaration that he was an overnight guest at the house in question; (2) an officer's testimony that he had spent the night inside the house; (3) the fact that his wallet and other identifying information were in the house; and (4) his attorney's declaration that a co-defendant would testify that the defendant was an overnight guest. 69 F.3d at 308. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, "[a]t most, the evidence suggest[ed] that [the defendant] was legitimately on the premises, which is insufficient to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The court in Armenta compared the defendant's situation to United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1991), where the defendant had a key to the apartment, stored things there, and was free to come and go as he pleased. Id. at 308. Moreover, the defendant in Davis took the precaution of storing his possessions in a locked safe in the owner's apartment to ensure his privacy and had previously lived in the apartment and continued to pay a portion of the rent. Id. The facts in Davis suggested the defendant was an "overnight guest of the sort . . . envisioned by the Supreme Court[], i.e., one who is in the owner's home with the permission of his host, and one who is engaging in a longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society." Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Thus, a defendant's "bald assertion that he was an overnight guest," and nothing more, is certainly insufficient to establish that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Reyes-Bosque, one of the defendants merely stated that he was at the house to rest and stay overnight. 596 F.3d at 1027. Although the defendant contended that his presence as an overnight guest was an undisputed fact, the Ninth Circuit disagreed. Id. Besides the defendant's own statement, there was no evidence that he had personal items with him that suggested he was staying the night, had a key to the location, stored items at the location, or was free to come and go as he pleased. Id. And, most notably, the person in control of the location never stated that he had given the defendant permission to stay as an overnight guest. Id. As a result, the court held the evidence did not establish the defendant as an overnight guest, thus, he lacked standing to challenge the search. Id. at 1028.
Here, too, Defendant has presented insufficient evidence. The Court has Defendant's own statement that he was an overnight guest in the motel room, see Def.'s Decl. at 1, and statements from others that he had just emerged from the shower when the police entered the room, see Officer's Report at 3-4. But that is all. Moreover, Riggins, the person in control of the motel room, denied anyone else was staying there with her. See Spencer Body Camera Footage at 4:10-4:50. Defendant has failed to present any evidence (other than his own statement) that contradicts or corrects Riggins' statement that she was staying in the motel room alone. For example, a declaration from Riggins herself might have been persuasive. Absent that, or any other persuasive evidence, the Court does not find that Defendant was an overnight guest. Thus, Defendant lacks standing to challenge the search. Given this finding the Court need not reach the other arguments raised by the Government in opposition to this motion.
III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: November 18, 2020
/s/ _________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE