Finally, the fifth factor-the length of time between the initial observation and the identification-slightly favors suppression, as approximately four months passed before Tolliver could identify Smith as the aggressor.See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201 (expressing concern about the lapse of seven months between the crime and the confrontation and noting that this "would be a seriously negative factor in most cases"); Manson, 432 U.S. at 116 (photographic identification took place only two days later, and the Supreme Court highlighted that "[w]e do not have here the passage of weeks or months between the crime and the viewing of the photograph"); id. at 131 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fact is that the greatest memory loss occurs within hours after an event . . . [i]f the time gap is any greater, reliability necessarily decreases."); United States v. McCrary, No. 1:18-cr-26, 2018 WL 3575053, at *9 (S.D. Ohio July 25, 2018) ("There was no time lag of hours, days, or months, to hinder the [witness'] memory and thwart a positive identification."); Crozier, 259 F.3d at 512 (agreeing that the length of time cut in favor of suppression where "[o]ne month had passed between the robbery and the impermissibly suggestive photographic line up"). Although the Sixth Circuit has upheld similar time periods of multiple months where other strong indicia of reliability existed, this case clearly does not involve a strong showing on any of the other Biggers factors to mitigate against the fifth factor's weak showing. See, e.g., Howard, 405 F.3d at 473 (finding that three months is not an excessive length of time where witness provided a prior accurate description, had ample opportunity to view the perpetrator, exhibited a high degree of attention, and exhibited confidence by immediately picking the defendant out of a lin