Opinion
Case No. 2:01-CR-00128(3)
05-09-2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. TYRON J. MAYNUS, Defendant.
JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Tyron J. Maynus' Motion to Terminate Supervised Release (Doc. 139). Defendant asks the Court to terminate his term of supervised release early, on account of his good behavior and full compliance with all terms of his supervised release for nearly four and a half years. (Id. at 2). Defendant also notes that his Probation Office, U.S.P.O. Matt Moore, supports his Motion. (Id.). The United States opposes, on account of the egregious nature of his arrest, his criminal history, and his previous violations of probation. (Doc. 140 at 2-3).
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 2, 2001, Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), & 846. (Plea Agreement, Doc. 51). Defendant was sentenced on March 14, 2003, to 121 months incarceration, followed by five years supervised release, with a $100 special assessment. (Doc. 106). Judgment was entered on March 27, 2003. (Doc. 107).
As described in the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), Defendant was arrested under noteworthy circumstances. While stopped at a traffic stop, law enforcement officers discovered that Defendant and his co-Defendant were transporting more than 5 kilograms of cocaine in a compartment in their car. Officers attempted to arrest Defendant, who ran from the officers and commandeered a police cruiser that had been left running. He drove the cruiser at the officers, who opened fire on him, and ultimately rammed several civilian vehicles while attempting to escape, before being apprehended. (PSR ¶¶ 9-10). Accordingly, at sentencing, Defendant was assessed a two-level sentencing enhancement because he "created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer." (Id. ¶ 24).
Defendant was released from imprisonment and began his period of supervised release on July 28, 2009. On December 3, 2013, Defendant filed this Motion to Terminate Supervised Release. (Doc. 139). Defendant argues that over the last nearly four and a half years, he "has been in full compliance with the terms of his supervised release . . . has reported as directed to his probation officer, tested negative for drugs, maintained employment, and had no contact with the criminal justice system." (Doc. 139 at 2). Thus, Defendant asserts that early termination is warranted by his conduct, and serves the interest of justice. (Id.). Defendant further notes that U.S.P.O. Matt Moore "fully supports this motion." (Id.).
The United States opposes. The United States cites the circumstances of Defendants' arrest, as well as Defendant's criminal history, to argue against early termination. (Doc. 140 at 2-3). It points to Defendant's Criminal History Category of III, including his several previous violations of probation resulting in additional penalties. (Id. at 3) (citing PSR ¶ 31). The United States thus "submits that [Defendant's substantial compliance with the terms of his supervised release] alone does not justify termination." (Id.). It adds that, while supervised release "may cause some inconvenience," Defendant has not argued how supervised release is adversely affecting his life. (Id.). The United States concludes that Defendant's offenses are of the sort that are "so egregious that the offenders should be required to serve the entire period of supervised release." (Id.). It also notes that alternatives, such as low intensity supervision, could be considered instead of complete termination. (Id.).
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Section 3583(e)(1) of Title 18, United States Code, permits early termination of supervised release, after the expiration of one year of supervised release, if the Court is satisfied that such action "is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice." Factors to be considered in granting early termination include: (1) "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant"; (2) the need "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct"; (3) the need "to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant"; (4) the need "to provide the defendant with needed education nor vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment"; (5) the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant; (6) any pertinent policy statement issued by the United States Sentencing Commission; (7) "he need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct"; and (8) "the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense." 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), & (a)(7).
In this case, the need to provide further training or services, any policy statements, the threat of unwarranted disparities, and the need to provide restitution are not relevant. The Court must consider, however, the nature of Defendant's crime, his criminal history, the need to deter criminal conduct, the possibility of further crimes, and the kinds of sentences usually imposed. Defendant was convicted of a serious crime, under extreme and dangerous circumstances that posed a threat to law enforcement officers as well as civilians. Defendant, transporting more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, fled from police officers, commandeered a police cruiser, and attempted to run down several officers. He rammed multiple civilian vehicles with the cruiser, and put both officers and bystanders in serious risk of death.
Accordingly, the Court finds that neither "the conduct of the defendant" nor "the interest of justice" justify early termination of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)(1) in this case. In light of the nature of Defendant's crime, his egregious conduct at his arrest, and his criminal history, Defendant's Motion must be DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Terminate Supervised Release (Doc. 139) is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE