"Correct decisions are never worthy of en banc review." United States v. Matchett , 837 F.3d 1118, 1129 (11th Cir. 2016) (W. Pryor, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc). And in any event, the dissent makes no effort to square its pursuit of en banc rehearing with the governing criteria for en banc worthiness.

See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892-95 (concluding that the advisory sentencing guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge: the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies only to "laws that define criminal offenses and laws that fix the permissible sentences for criminal offenses." (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Matchett, 837 F.3d 1118, 1122 (11th Cir. 2016) ("the vagueness doctrine applies only to laws that regulate private conduct" including laws that define crimes, fix sentences, restrict speech, and regulate businesses). About Izquierdo's second argument, the "exculpatory no" doctrine was eliminated by the Supreme Court in Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 404 (1998).

And, in the lone decision holding that Johnson did not apply, four judges dissented from the court's subsequent denial of rehearing en banc. See generally United States v. Matchett , 837 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 2016).Moreover, prior to Beckles , several district courts in our circuit had applied Johnson to the career offender guideline.

I concur in the result of this decision. I write separately to note only that I continue to respectfully disagree with our analysis in United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015), for the reasons I have previously expressed in United States v. Matchett, 837 F.3d 1118, 1143 (11th Cir. 2016) (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

The Government contends that the Texas assault offense “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”See United States v. Matchett , 802 F.3d 1185, 1196 (11th Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc denied , 837 F.3d 1118, No. 14–10396, 2016 WL 4757211 (11th Cir. September 13, 2016) ; see also United States v. Gonzalez–Longoria , 831 F.3d 670, 679, 681, No. 15–40041, 2016 WL 4169127, at *6, *8 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2016) (Jones, J., concurring) (contending that the majority opinion's holding that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is not unconstitutionally vague “could have been obviated with a holding that neither the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, nor extrinsic statutes cross-referenced in the Guidelines, are subject to challenges based on the Due Process Clause's prohibition of vague laws” and that “Due process requires only notice and predictability in the statutory range of punishments following conviction.... [and] vagueness challenges cannot stand against a discretionary scheme of sentencing within that range”).See United States v. Calabretta, 831 F.3d 128, 133-34, No. 14–3969, 2016 WL 3997215, at *4 (3d Cir. July 26, 2016) ; United States v. Pawlak , 822 F.3d 902, 903 (6th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Hurlburt , 835 F.3d 715, 717-

But “the vagueness doctrine applies only to laws that regulate the primary conduct of private citizens”-i.e., “laws that define crimes,” “laws that fix sentences,” “laws that restrict speech,” and “laws that regulate businesses.” United States v. Matchett, 837 F.3d 1118, 1119, 1122 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc); see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 856 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“If a statute regulating private conduct provides no discernible standards and therefore insufficient notice of what actions are prohibited, the statute might be void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause.”).

Notice means that a law does not give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited [or required], so that he may act accordingly.” United States v. Matchett, 837 F.3d 1118, 1122 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotes omitted). Article I.C, a general provision that applies globally, states that a landowner wishing to subdivide must submit a plat “which shall conform to the minimum requirements set forth in these regulations.” (Doc. 9-1 at 6).

So the Policy is not overbroad. A restriction is unconstitutionally vague if it "does not give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited" or it "leaves government actors free do decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited." SeeUnited States v. Matchett , 837 F.3d 1118, 1122 (11th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Here, the Policy precisely lists what it expects of speakers and the Chair, so it gives a person of ordinary intelligence warning of prohibited conduct.

The Eleventh Circuit has held that the "advisory sentencing guidelines cannot be challenged as void for vagueness." United States v. Matchett, 837 F.3d 1118, 1119 (11th Cir. 2016) ("[T]he vagueness doctrine applies only to laws that regulate the primary conduct of private sentences. Advisory sentencing guidelines regulate judges, not private individuals; they guide judicial discretion within a statutory range.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that Johnson did not invalidate the residual clause of the guidelines because "the advisory Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause." Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 890 (2017); see also United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1193-96 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the void-for-vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines), reh'g denied, 837 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 2016). Thus, Beckles forecloses Terry's challenge to the application of the career offender guideline, and his Johnson claim fails.