Opinion
Robert M. Holley, Attorney at Law, Sacramento, California, Counsel for Lio William Mataafa.
Mr. Richard Bender, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney, Supervising Counsel for Mr. Daniel Stoddard McConcie, Jr.
Mr. John R. Duree, Jr. Counsel for Defendant Jaclyn Susan Majstoric.
Mr. Ron Peters, Counsel for Defendant Frankie Thomas Goulding.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;FINDINGS AND ORDER
LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Lio William Mataafa, Jaclyn Susan Majstoric, and Frankie Thomas Goulding, by and through their respective undersigned counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference for Wednesday, May 29, 2013 at 9:15 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendants, and each of them, now move to continue the status conference to Tuesday, July 2, 2013 at 9:15 a.m. and to exclude time from May 29, 2013 up to and including July 2, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request. Court find the following:
a. All parties have been actively involved in resolving these matters and avoiding the necessity of a jury trial. Counsel for the government has been on a necessary paternity leave and is scheduled to return to duty on June 10, 2013. Continued negotiations after that time are expected to resolve, prior to the advent of this new proposed date for status conference. The government does not object to the continuance.
b. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of, May 29, 2013 2013 up to and including July 2, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.