But, if "Congress fails to define the criminal unit or the legislative intent in this regard is ambiguous, any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity." United States v. Mason , 611 F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2333, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019) ("Employing the canon as the government wishes would also sit uneasily with the rule of lenity's teaching that ambiguities about the breadth of a criminal statute should be resolved in the defendant's favor.").

Conceivably, multiple associated false entries made at the same time to conceal the same misconduct might be insufficient to support multiple § 1519 counts. Cf. United States v. Mason, 611 F.2d 49, 52–53 (4th Cir.1979) (finding that multiple related false statements made at the same time within the same “transaction” of purchasing multiple firearms only supported a single violation of the statute at issue in that case). That said, there is some authority from other circuits indicating that statutory language similar to § 1519 supports a separate criminal count for each and every false entry, regardless of whether they are made on the same day and in the same document.

This court is urged to follow those decisions which hold that Congress never declared an intention to punish indistinguishable multiple firearms violations. See United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1983) (under 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202 interstate transportation of firearms by a convicted felon and 18 U.S.C. § 922, registration, simultaneous possession of more than one weapon is but one offense); United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449 (3rd Cir. 1982) (simultaneous possession of several firearms by convicted felon constitutes a single offense under § 1202(a) and 922(b) absent a showing that weapons were acquired or stored separately); United States v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1980) (possession of multiple firearms under sections 1202(a) and 922(b) is one offense, entailing single sentence); Brown v. United States, 623 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1980) (two false statements on a single document constitutes one offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6); United States v. Mason, 611 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1979) (simultaneous receipt of more than one firearm constituted one offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) and 922(h)(1)); United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1975) (absent a showing that two firearms were stored or acquired at different times or places there is only one offense, not two under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)); United States v. Carty, 447 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1971) (possession of multiple firearms in interstate transportation by felon constitutes but one offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(i)). This case is different.

Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985). See also United States v. Murphy, 326 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2003) (vacating multiplicative contempt convictions); United States v. Bennafield, 287 F.3d 320, 324 (4th Cir. 2002) (same for convictions for possession of a controlled substance); Dunford, 148 F.3d at 390 (firearms possession); United States v. Mason, 611 F.2d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 1979) (receipt of firearms and making false written statements). Shorter — a convicted felon and illegal drug user who had two guns in his house — was charged in two counts (eight and nine) of violating § 922(g).

Id. at 84. We applied these principles in United States v. Mason, 611 F.2d 49, 52-53 (4th Cir. 1979), to hold that defendant, who had purchased multiple firearms in one transaction and had misrepresented his qualification to possess those firearms on separate information forms submitted for each firearm, could not be convicted of separate offenses for making false statements in connection with each firearm. Similarly, in United States v. Mullins, 698 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1983), while we held that multiple possession of firearms at different times were separate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), a now — repealed statutory ancestor of § 922(g), we stated the rule that "when a convicted felon acquires two or more firearms in one transaction and stores and possesses them together, he commits only one offense under § 1202(a)(1)."

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) ( en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981.See also United States v. Jones, 841 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Baugh, 787 F.2d 1131, 1132 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1336 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mason, 611 F.2d 49, 51-52 (4th Cir. 1979). In Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as precedent all decisions of Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Other cases have involved separate instances of providing false information, but they are unlike the instant case, where, in the process of a single transaction form, the defendant used false written statements and false identification as the means of deceiving the firearms dealer solely with respect to the defendant's true identity. See United States v. Solomon, 726 F.2d 677 (11th Cir. 1984) (false information on two separate ATF forms, on two separate days, for the sale of two firearms constitutes two separate offenses); United States v. Williams, 685 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant was correctly indicted on seven counts where he bought seven guns on five separate occasions and made a false statement concerning his criminal record on the separate ATF forms that he filled out for each of the seven guns); United States v. Mason, 611 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1979) (simultaneous execution of multiple forms in which defendant falsely responded that he had not been convicted treated as only one offense); United States v. Long, 524 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1975) (two separate violations where defendant gave false information on two forms for the purchase of two guns). While Mastrangelo's convictions are affirmed, we hold that the district court erred in imposing separate sentences for Mastrangelo's convictions on Counts I and II.

Our view follows that of eight other circuits that have considered the issue, either with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 922 or 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a), which provides that any convicted felon "who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm" is guilty of a crime. In addition to United States v. Oliver, supra, see United States v. Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239, 244-46 (3d Cir. 1982) (§ 922(h)); United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 453-55 (3d Cir. 1982) (§ 12-2(a)); United States v. Mason, 611 F.2d 49, 50-52 (4th Cir. 1979) (§ 922(h)); United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 325-28 (5th Cir. 1981) (§ 1202(a)); United States v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 350, 351-52 (5th Cir. 1980) (§§ 922(h), 1202(a)); United States v. Carty, 447 F.2d 964, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1971) (§ 922(i)); United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715, 720-21 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965, 97 S.Ct. 2920, 53 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1977) (§ 1202(a)); United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 869 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950, 95 S.Ct. 1683, 44 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975) (§ 1202(a)); United States v. Powers, 572 F.2d 146, 150-52 (8th Cir. 1978) (§ 922(h)); Brown v. United States, 623 F.2d 54, 56-59 (9th Cir. 1980) (§ 922(a)(6)); United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 292-94 (10th Cir. 1983) (§§ 922(h), 1202(a)). Each of these cases dealt with simultaneous receipt of more than one gun; Oliver itself dealt with the precise issue before this court — simultaneous receipt of a gun and ammunition.

When a statute is clear, it must be read to mean what it says. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 67, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1537, 71 L.Ed.2d 748, 755 (1982); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246, 252 (1981); Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 483, 101 S.Ct. 2468, 2475, 69 L.Ed.2d 171, 180 (1981). See, e.g. Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133, 95 S.Ct. 335, 353, 42 L.Ed.2d 320, 347 (1974); Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co., 342 U.S. 197, 200, 72 S.Ct. 223, 225, 96 L.Ed. 225, 229 (1952); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 484-85, 68 S.Ct. 634, 635, 92 L.Ed. 823, 825 (1952); United States v. Mason, 611 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1979); Zeigler Coal Co. v. Kleppe, 536 F.2d 398, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Administrative agencies are given latitude in interpreting statutes they execute.

At least seven other circuits have now reached similar results under either section 922 or section 1202, or under both. See, e.g., United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 450-55 (3d Cir. 1982) (§ 1202); United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 325-28 (5th Cir. 1981) (§ 1202); Brown v. United States, 623 F.2d 54, 56-59 (9th Cir. 1980) (false statements in connection with acquisition of firearm, § 922(a)(6)); United States v. Mason, 611 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1979) (receipt under § 922(h)(1) and false statements under § 922(a)(6)); United States v. Powers, 572 F.2d 146, 150-52 (8th Cir. 1978) (extending Kinsley to case involving receipt under § 922(h)(1)); United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715, 720-22 (6th Cir. 1976) (§ 1202), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965, 97 S.Ct. 2920, 53 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1977); United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 869 (7th Cir.) (§ 1202), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950, 95 S.Ct. 1683, 44 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975); McFarland v. Pickett, 469 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1972) (§ 922(j), concealing stolen firearms); United States v. Carty, 447 F.2d 964, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1971) (§ 922(i), interstate transportation of stolen firearms). Cf. Sanders v. United States, 441 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1971) (simultaneous possession of two unregistered firearms is two offenses under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); Bell v. United States distinguished because § 5861(d) uses the article "a" instead of "any"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846, 92 S.Ct. 147, 30 L.Ed.2d 82 (1971).