Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Richard J. Bender, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Angel Martinez-Diaz, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on December 10, 2013. Additionally, by previous order, the following motion schedule was agreed upon: defense motions due 11/26/13; oppositions due 12/10/13; replies due 12/17; and, a hearing on the motions is scheduled for 1/7/14. No motions were filed by any defendants.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until January 21, 2014 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between December 10, 2013 and January 21, 2014 under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
JOHN R. MANNING (SBN 220874), ATTORNEY AT LAW, Sacramento, CA., Attorney for Defendant, ANGEL MARTINEZ-DIAZ.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This case currently contains over a 100 pages of discovery as well as two DVD's with videos and one CD of audio recordings (the recordings are in Spanish).
b. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.
c. Mr. Martinez-Diaz is from Honduras. During the course of meeting with Mr. Martinez-Diaz, it became apparent issues surrounding his immigration status were quite complicated. As such, on November 13, 2013, I applied to the court for funding for the appointment of the UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic ("the Clinic") to review and analyze Mr. Martinez-Diaz's circumstances. On December 3, 2014, I was notified the funding request had been granted. The defense needs additional time to allow "the Clinic" to review and analyze Mr. Martinez-Diaz's immigration circumstances. Such a review is necessary in order to adequately advise Mr. Martinez-Diaz of the potential immigration consequences he faces with a guilty plea (or verdict).
d. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The Government does not object to the continuance.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of December 10, 2013 to January 21, 2014 is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.