Opinion
2:15-cr-00235-TLN
05-15-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DUMITRU MARTIN, Defendant.
ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Dumitru Martin's (“Defendant”) Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). (ECF No. 469.) The Government filed an opposition. (ECF No. 470.) Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 471.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On August 31, 2016, a jury found Defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One) and bribery of a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201 (Count Two). (ECF Nos. 156, 172.) On April 6, 2017, the Court sentenced Defendant to a 156-month term of imprisonment, to be followed by 36 months of supervised release. (ECF No. 275.) Defendant is currently serving his sentence at FCI Terminal Island. (ECF No. 470-1.) Defendant has served approximately 101 months of his 156-month sentence, and his projected release date with good conduct time is December 28, 2025. (Id.) Defendant filed the instant motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) on March 4, 2024. (ECF No. 469.)
II. Standard of Law
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (“§ 3582(c)(2)”) provides:
[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
The Court follows a two-step approach in determining whether a sentence reduction is warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). First, the Court must determine if a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines indeed lowers Defendant's guidelines range. Id. Second, the Court must consider any applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction is warranted in whole or in part under the circumstances of the case. Id.
III. Analysis
Defendant argues he is entitled to a “zero-point offender” reduction pursuant to Amendment 821, effective November 2023. (ECF No. 469 at 3.) In Part B Subpart 1 of Amendment 821, which applies retroactively, the Sentencing Commission added a “zero-point offender” provision in U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a) (“§ 4C1.1(a)”). Section 4C1.1(a) provides a two-level reduction in offense level for certain offenders who meet ten enumerated criteria.
Defendant argues he meets all the criteria set forth in § 4C1.1(a). (Id.) In opposition, the Government contends Defendant does not meet the tenth criterion, § 4C1.1(a)(10), which requires that “the defendant did not receive an adjustment under § 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 848.” (ECF No. 470 at 8.) Specifically, the Government points out that Defendant received a four-level adjustment under § 3B1.1 for his leadership role in the offense. (Id.)
Defendant argues the “and” in § 4C1.1(a)(10) makes clear that a person must have both received an adjustment under § 3B1.1 and engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise to be disqualified from the “zero-point offender” reduction. (ECF No. 469 at 4-5 (citing United States v. Lopez, 998 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2021).) Defendant does not dispute that he received an adjustment under § 3B1.1 but argues he still meets the tenth criterion because he was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. (Id.) Defendant also argues to the extent § 4C1.1(a)(10) is ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires the provision to be interpreted in his favor. (Id. at 7.)
Defendant fails to persuade the Court he is entitled to a “zero-point offender” reduction. Defendant's motion primarily relies on reasoning from Lopez, which, as he concedes in his reply, has now been abrogated by the Supreme Court in Pulsifer. (ECF No. 471 at 2-3); see Pulsifer v. United States, 144 S.Ct. 718, 723 (2024) (finding the requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) applicable to the safety-valve provision that a defendant “‘does not have A, B, and C' creates a checklist with three distinct conditions,” not “a single amalgamated condition for relief'). In his reply, Defendant vaguely argues “the word ‘and' in the safety-valve statute at issue in Pulfiser is set in an entirely different context than the way ‘and' is used in § 4C1.1(a)(10).” (ECF No. 471 at 2.) However, Defendant fails to develop this argument in any meaningful way, and it seems to contradict his pre-Pulfiser argument that Lopez controls the instant case. (ECF No. 469 at 5, 7 (arguing that Lopez involved “the safety-valve provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), which uses ‘and' in exactly the same way the Commission has used the word here”).)
Moreover, district courts across the country have unanimously rejected the same argument Defendant raises. See, e.g., United States v. Arroyo-Mata, No. 09-13, 2024 WL 1367796, at *2-4 & n.6 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 1, 2024) (collecting 24 cases). The Court agrees with those well-reasoned decisions and concludes § 4C1.1(a) unambiguously requires a defendant to meet all criteria listed in that section, including the tenth criterion, which precludes eligibility if the defendant received an adjustment under § 3B1.1. See id. at *3 (“Because both receiving an adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 and engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise are listed criteria, the presence of either destroys the capability to receive relief under Amendment 821.”); see also United States v. Owusu, No. 3:18-cr-77-TKW, 2023 WL 9328368, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2023) (“[A]s a matter of logic, if a zero-point offender is only eligible for a 2-level decrease when both A and B are false, then it necessarily follows that he is not eligible if either A or B is true.”).
Lastly, because the Court concludes § 4C1.1(a)(10) is unambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply. See United States v. D.M., 869 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he rule [of lenity] only applies where there is grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the guidelines”); see also Pulsifer, 144 S.Ct. at 737 (declining to apply the rule of lenity after finding the relevant statutory language to be unambiguous).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). (ECF No. 469.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.