Opinion
2:21-cv-02391 WBS DMC
02-28-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. MARBLE MOUNTAIN RANCH, INC.; DOUGLAS T. COLE; HEIDI A. COLE; NORMAN D. COLE; and CAROLYN T. COLE, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO INTERVENE
This matter was taken under submission without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). The scheduled April 1, 2024 hearing on the motion is hereby VACATED.
WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The United States government brought this action pertaining to fire suppression costs and other damages caused by the Marble Fire. (See Docket No. 1.) The parties settled the case on July 14, 2023. (See Docket No. 29.) On February 1, 2024, Konrad Fisher moved pro se to permissively intervene in this case, stating that the Marble Fire damaged his property and that he is concerned the settlement between the parties will leave inadequate insurance funds to cover his damages, which he is already pursuing in a pending state court action. (See Docket Nos. 38, 42.)
Pursuant to Rule 24(b), “[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(1). “If the court finds that the motion to intervene was not timely, it need not reach any of the remaining elements of Rule 24,” and therefore a “finding of untimeliness defeats a motion for permissive intervention.” See United States v. State of Wash., 86 F.3d 1499, 1507 (9th Cir. 1996). In determining whether a motion to intervene is timely, the court considers the totality of the circumstances, including “(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for and length of the delay.” Smith v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F.3d 843, 854 (9th Cir. 2016).
The court finds that Mr. Fisher's motion is not timely given the stage of this case, where the parties reached a settlement nearly seven months prior to Mr. Fisher's motion, following more than two years of litigation. Allowing intervention at this stage could “jeopardize[e] [the] settlement, to the potential prejudice of all the parties concerned in the underlying action, for the sake of a proposed intervenor who waited [to move to intervene] until the original parties had already reached an agreement to settle.” See Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Janet Greeson's A Place For Us, Inc., 62 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Cosgrove v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 770 Fed.Appx. 793, 795 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming denial of permissive intervention “because the case had been dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the parties” and permitting intervention could have “the potential effect of negating the settlement”).
Accordingly, the motion to intervene (Docket No. 38) is DENIED. In light of the parties' stipulation to dismiss the case (Docket No. 41), the Clerk of Court is instructed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.