Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, MICHELE BECKWITH, Assistant United States Attorneys, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.
DAVID BONILLA, Counsel for Edwin Malo-Vergera.
JENNIFER J. WIRSCHING, Counsel for Aurelio Rubin-Bulgin.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on July 18, 2013 at 9:00 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference until August 29, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. and to exclude time between July 18, 2013 and August 29, 2013 under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has provided defense counsel with discovery associated with this case, which includes several law enforcement reports and audio recordings. The government is in the process of producing additional discovery to defendants, which includes several hundreds of pages of documents and additional audio recordings.
b. On July 10, 2013, defendant Malo-Vergera retained private counsel, who has a notice of substitution of counsel pending before the court.
Defendant Junez-Ramirez is currently in state custody, and the court has signed a writ directing the U.S. Marshals to bring him forthwith to this court for initial appearance in this case. (See Dkt. No. 25) The writ has not yet been executed, so he has not yet made an appearance in this case. Status of counsel is unknown.
c. Based on the foregoing, defense counsel needs additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to review the materials described above and to discuss them with their clients, and otherwise effectively prepare for the disposition of this case. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of the parties, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on August 29, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. and that it find excludable time from July 18, 2013 through and including the August 29, 2013 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to August 29, 2013 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case and excluding time as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 18, 2013 to August 29, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
Pursuant to the parties' stipulation and good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the status conference, currently set for July 18, 2013, is hereby vacated and continued to August 29, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 7. It is further ORDERED that the time period between July 18, 2013 and August 29, 2013 is excluded from the calculation under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to Local Code T4 for the reasons stated in the parties' stipulation.