Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants by and through their counsels of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 12, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendants Edwin Malo-Vegara, Jose Ramirez and Aurelio Bulgin, now move to continue the status conference until April 2, 2015 and to exclude time between February 12, 2015 and April 2, 2015 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has provided defense counsel with discovery associated with this case, which includes several law enforcement reports and audio recordings. Additional discovery has been produced, which includes several hundreds of pages of documents and additional audio recordings.
KELLY BABINEAU, The Law Office of Kelly Babineau, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for EDWIN MALO-VEGARA.
KYLE KNAPP, Attorney for JOSE JUNEZ-RAMIREZ.
ERIN RADKIN, Attorney for AURELIO RUBIN-BULGIN.
b. Counsels for the defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to review the current charges, to finish the investigation and research related to the charges, and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients.
c. Based on the foregoing, defense counsel need additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to consult with their clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of the parties, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on April 2, 2015, at 9:00 a.m. and that it find excludable time from February 12, 2015 through and including the April 2, 2015 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to April 2, 2015 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 12, 2015 to April 2, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.