Opinion
No. 1:17-CR-1235 WJ-6
06-09-2021
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Marcus TAYLOR a.k.a "Taylor Made", Defendant.
Jack Burkhead, Letitia Carroll Simms, U.S. Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff. D. Eric Hannum, Lomas Law Complex, Keith R. Romero, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant.
Jack Burkhead, Letitia Carroll Simms, U.S. Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.
D. Eric Hannum, Lomas Law Complex, Keith R. Romero, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION OPPOSING IMPOSITION OF $5,000 ASSESSMENT UNDER 18 U.S.C. 3014
WILLIAM P. JOHNSON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion Opposing Imposition of $5,000 Assessment Under 18 U.S.C. 3014, filed May 24, 2021 (Doc. 558) (the "Motion"). The Motion asks the Court to reconsider imposing the $5,000 assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3014, because Defendant has outstanding debt, no assets, and no income, and is therefore "indigent" for purposes of the Act. See § 3014(a) (requiring the Court to impose a $5,000 assessment on non-indigent defendants at sentencing); Doc. 558 at 2 (citing PSR ¶ 190). The Government argues in its Response to the Motion (Doc. 581) that debt and a lack of assets and income are not alone determinative of whether a defendant is unable to pay a § 3014 assessment in the future. The Government cites to United States v. Bonilla , which found that a defendant had twenty years to pay a special assessment, notwithstanding his imprisonment and eventual deportation to Mexico, and therefore that the district court did not err in imposing the assessment because he could "earn sufficient wages to pay the special assessment in due time." 743 Fed. Appx. 210, 216-17 (10th Cir. 2018). In his Reply to the Government's Response (Doc. 583), Defendant notes that United States v. Kelley , the Eighth Circuit case cited in Bonilla , held that a defendant had the ability to earn money in the future and was therefore precluded from a finding of indigence because he was college educated. See 861 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2017). Defendant concludes that he has no such education or employable skills, and therefore will likely never be able to pay the assessment. Doc. 558 at 2, ¶ 8. According to Defendant, a finding that he "may have" the ability to pay the assessment is insufficient under § 3014 to impose the assessment.
The Court disagrees with Defendant. "Indigence" as to § 3014, that is, an inability to pay a $5,000 assessment to the Domestic Trafficking Victims’ Fund over the course of twenty years, is not confined to a calculation of Defendant's present assets. These assessments are not due immediately, and the law, as well as common sense, supports the notion that a defendant's future earning potential may be taken into account when deciding whether such defendant is capable of eventually paying a fine to victims of trafficking. See United States v. Janatsch , 722 F. App'x 806, 811 (10th Cir. 2018) ("[N]othing in [ § 3014 ] precludes an examination of future ability to pay as part of a holistic assessment of the indigency determination.").
Here, by his own account, Defendant is healthy and physically able, and does not suffer from any diagnosed mental infirmities. There is no reason to infer that such an individual will be "indigent" for the rest of his life, as Defendant claims in the Motion. Doc. 558 at 2, ¶ 8. Furthermore, it is not the case that a college degree or diploma is necessary to make a reasonable wage, much less to pay a $5,000 assessment over a twenty-year period. Defendant's debt is also somewhat meaningless to the analysis because, as the Government reveals, this debt is limited to an outstanding cable bill in the amount of $342.
It should also be noted that Defendant's present lack of assets is unsurprising, as Defendant has been incarcerated for nearly four years and, prior to his arrest, Defendant's income was a product of drug trafficking and sex trafficking of women. As the Government notes, this lack of assets "is no different than most inmates in Mr. Taylor's situation, and is not determinative of future earning potential." Doc. 581 at 2. The Court agrees, and a finding otherwise would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act. Sections 3014(c) and (d) provide for the establishment of a "Domestic Trafficking Victims’ Fund" with proceeds derived from assessments made pursuant to the Act. If most defendants were exempted from the assessment merely because they lacked assets at the time of sentencing, then the Domestic Trafficking Victims’ Fund would have very few resources with which to assist and protect victims of trafficking.
For these reasons, the Court will not reconsider its imposition of the $5,000 assessment imposed pursuant § 3014. Defendant is more than capable of earning a law-abiding living upon release if he chooses, and the Court hopes that the subject assessment will incentivize him to do so. The Motion is DENIED .