Opinion
Malcolm Segal, Emily E. Doringer, SEGAL & ASSOCIATES, PC, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Defendant DAVID M. LEWIS.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous orders, the status conference in this matter was set for April 23, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant requests that the status conference be continued by stipulation to June 18, 2015, and to exclude time between April 23, 2015 and June 18, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and documents obtained through the criminal investigation in electronic form that exceeds 20, 000 pages.
b. The United States has made available forensic copies of x-rays and other medical records for review by defense counsel. Those and other records must be carefully reviewed and analyzed by an expert in the technical aspects of dentistry. Defense counsel has engaged expert consultants to assist in the review process, one an accomplished out-of-state expert dentist. At the defendant's request, the government has made arrangements for the expert to review original x-rays at the office of the Department of Labor in San Francisco, California on May 8, 2015.
c. Counsel for defendant needs additional time to conduct additional investigation and research relating to the charges, review the discovery, consult with experts in dentistry after the x-rays have been reviewed, consult with his client and otherwise prepare for further proceedings and trial.
d. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant a continuance would preclude reasonable and necessary time for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The government does not object to the continuance.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 23, 2015 to June 18, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.