Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, TODD A. PICKLES, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
ALAN BAUM, Esq., Counsel for Defendant.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 13, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until September 24, 2013 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between August 13, 2013 and September 24, 2013 under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes over 600 pages of written documents, including investigative reports, that have been produced in electronic form as well as approximately eleven DVDs containing video-graphic evidence. All of this discovery was produced directly to Olaf Hedberg, Esq., previous counsel for defendant. Stipulation and Proposed Order re: 1 Continuance of Status Hearing
b) On April 2, 2013, Alan Baum, Esq., was substituted as counsel for Olaf Hedberg, Esq. Counsel for defendant has recently requested additional discovery, which the United States is presently attempting to determine whether the requested information exists and if so, whether, it will agree to produce it.
c) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review discovery in this matter and to consult with his client, including discussing options with respect to this case with his client, including potential resolution or setting the matter for trial.
d) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e) The United States does not object to the continuance.
f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 13, 2013 to September 24, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.