Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE OF STATUS CONFERENCE; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Defendant, TAMMY LEE, by and through her counsel of record, TONI CARBONE, and the GOVERNMENT hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 12, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until January 30, 2014, and to exclude time between December 12, 2013 and January 30, 2014 under Local Code T4. The GOVERNMENT does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case to date, and provided to defense counsel, includes investigative reports and related documents in electronic form amounting to approximately 2, 548 pages of documents.
b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The GOVERNMENT does not object to the continuance.
TONI H. CARBONE (SBN 210119), ATTORNEY AT LAW, Auburn, CA, Attorney for Defendant, TAMMY LEE.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, JARED DOLAN, Assistant U.S. Attorney, For the United States.
d. The GOVERNMENT and counsel for the defendant are working toward resolution of the case.
g. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 31, 2013 to December 12, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.