Opinion
JOHN R. MANNING, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Sacramento, CA. Attorney for Defendant DUWAYNE LEDOUX
Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney,
JASON HITT, Assistant U.S. Attorney,
AMENDED STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jason Hitt, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Duwayne Ledoux, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for trial confirmation hearing on August 13, 2015 with a trial date of September 14, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the trial confirmation hearing until September 10, 2015, at 9:30 a.m., and to vacate the presently set trial date of September 14, 2015 and reschedule the trial for October 26, 2015, at 9:00 a.m., and exclude time between August 13, 2015 and October 26, 2015 under the Local CodeT-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. Mr. Ledoux resides in Kodiak, Alaska. The parties in this matter are, after extensive negotiations, very close to resolving this matter. The government is expected to provide a draft plea agreement to the defense imminently. The defense will then need time to review the plea agreement, in detail with the defendant. The defense will additionally need time to review and discuss with defendant his guideline and statutory exposure. The parties are cautiously optimistic the matter will resolve in/with a change of plea on the date requested herein.
b. Counsel for defendant believes the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The Government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of August 13, 2015 and October 26, 2015 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A)) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 11th day of August, 2015.