Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER [18 U.S.C. § 3161]
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant Arthur Menefee, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order this matter was set for a status hearing on April 23, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 7, 2015 and to exclude time between April 23, 2015 and May 7, 2015, under Local Codes T4 and T2. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) On May 1, 2013, the parties except Florence Francisco appeared before the Court for a status hearing at which time the Court, the Honorable Kimberly J. Mueller, presiding, deemed the case complex under Local Code T2 and the corresponding section of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq.
b) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, loan records, and related documents in electronic form that constitute approximately 40, 000 pages. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, TODD A. PICKLES, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
MARK J. REICHEL, ESQ., Counsel for defendant Arthur Menefee.
c) Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to conduct his investigation and research related to the charges, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, and to otherwise prepare a defense. Further, counsel for defendant represents that he is currently in a multi-week trial.
d) Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e) The United States does not object to the continuance.
f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 23, 2015 through May 7, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
h) This time period is also deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(ii) [Local Code T2] on the basis that the case is complex due to the number of defendants and nature of the prosecution.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.