"Under the common-law tradition, stealing property from another normally does not equate with `receiving' property from its rightful owner." McMinn, 103 F.3d at 219; see also United States v. Koran, 453 F.2d 144, 146 (10th Cir. 1972) ("[T]he offense of possession of stolen goods is distinct from the offense of receiving" them.); Heflin v. United States, 223 F.2d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 1955) ("[R]eceiving stolen money and conspiracy are offenses separate from bank robbery. . . ."). It is unnecessary to apply a "plain error" analysis to this argument because we will assume that, in objecting to the enhancement itself, defense counsel properly objected at sentencing to the implicit finding that Sharon was also a fence.
This was sufficient to prove a violation of § 659. United States v. Koran, 453 F.2d 144, 146 (10th Cir.1972) (violation of § 659 can be proven by showing defendant retained possession of the goods after becoming aware the goods were stolen). But even assuming this exchange is not enough, any error in the colloquy did not affect his substantial rights because Rollings was informed prior to the plea colloquy of the intent element.
This construction is reasonable because in instances similar to the case at bar the long continued possession of goods may well allow circumstances to give rise to knowledge that the property had been stolen even though the original receipt of the goods may have been innocent.United States v. Koran, 453 F.2d 144, 146 (10th Cir. 1972). Appellants were not indicted for receiving stolen money.
McManaman v. United States, 327 F.2d 21 (10th Cir.); Seefeldt v. United States, 183 F.2d 713 (10th Cir.); Edwards v. United States, 7 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.). See also United States v. Koran, 453 F.2d 144 (10th Cir.), as to the retention of property knowing it to have been stolen under 18 U.S.C. § 659. Affirmed.
Indeed, defendant was extremely vague respecting his possession of them but it is clear that such a state of facts is no substitute for proof by the prosecution that defendant "knowingly" possessed stolen property, an element which the statute itself mandates as part of the People's case. In discussing the question of when one is chargeable with possession of stolen goods in United States v. Koran ( 453 F.2d 144, 146), Circuit Judge DOYLE stated: "(1) It is, of course, essential that a defendant charged with possession of stolen goods must be shown to have had guilty knowledge.