Opinion
Case No. 1:22-cr-00044-SMR-HCA-1
2023-08-10
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. George Madison KITCHEN, IV, Defendant.
Shelly M. Sudmann, Richard E. Rothrock, United States Attorneys Office, Council Bluffs, IA, for Plaintiff. Ellen Katzman Michaels, Pro Hac Vice, Ellen K. Michaels & Associates, PLLC, West Bloomfield Township, MI, Michael F. Maloney, Public Defender, Federal Public Defenders Office, Sioux City, IA, for Defendant.
Shelly M. Sudmann, Richard E. Rothrock, United States Attorneys Office, Council Bluffs, IA, for Plaintiff. Ellen Katzman Michaels, Pro Hac Vice, Ellen K. Michaels & Associates, PLLC, West Bloomfield Township, MI, Michael F. Maloney, Public Defender, Federal Public Defenders Office, Sioux City, IA, for Defendant. ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STEPHANIE M. ROSE, CHIEF JUDGE
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 20, 2022, Officer Sharp with the Council Bluffs Police Department ("CBPD") was stopped at a red light at the intersection of Ninth Avenue and North Frontage Road in Council Bluffs, Iowa. While waiting for this light to change, Officer Sharp observed that the light for the northbound traffic on Frontage Road changed from yellow to red. Moments later, he witnessed a white van travel through the intersection without stopping at the light.
Officer Sharp turned right onto Frontage Road to follow the vehicle. He followed the vehicle for several blocks before initiating a stop, which he did to avoid a concrete barrier on the side of the road. Specifically, Officer Sharp initiated a stop after Fifth Avenue and North Frontage Road. He called out a description of the vehicle, the location, and that no license plate was visible over the radio. The vehicle came to a stop near Second Avenue and North Frontage Road.
Officer Sharp exited his cruiser and approached the driver's side of the vehicle. Defendant, the driver of the vehicle, had the paper copy of his license ready for Officer Sharp. Defendant did not have a bill of sale or vehicle title on his person, which led Officer Sharp to ask Defendant for insurance information. While speaking with Defendant at the driver's side window, Officer Sharp noticed an odor of marijuana. Officer Sharp ran the dealership plate and returned to his cruiser. He manually entered the Defendant's information into the NCIC database but did not receive any positive information back. He ran the Defendant's driver's license through dispatch and called for backup. CBPD Officer Hidalgo then arrived on scene shortly afterwards.
Officer Sharp explained to Officer Hidalgo that he intended to have the occupants step out of the vehicle, search the car, and run the VIN. Officer Sharp intended to issue Defendant a warning if nothing was found in the vehicle. After discussing this plan, Officer Sharp approached the driver's side and informed Defendant that he needed to exit the vehicle. As Officer Sharp was standing at the driver's side window speaking to the Defendant, the Defendant switched the vehicle into drive and drove away at a high rate of speed.
Officers Hidalgo and Sharp immediately returned to their vehicles and informed dispatch that Defendant had fled. They followed Defendant for an extended period of time while traveling at speeds in excess of ninety miles-per-hour. Despite the efforts, Officers Hidalgo and Sharp were unable to catch Defendant's vehicle. Pottawatomie County Sheriff's Office Deputy Windham began his pursuit of the vehicle and reached a speed of one hundred and twenty miles per hour. At mile marker 6.2 on northbound Interstate 29, Deputy Windham watched a plastic bag exit the passenger side window of the vehicle. The bag hit the ground, exploded, and expelled a white cloud upwards. Deputy Windham observed these events and continued the pursuit.
Further up the road, the Harrison County Sheriff's Office placed stop strips in the road around mile marker seventy-five. The strips destroyed a front tire and the vehicle came to a stop at mile marker seventy-seven. Defendant was arrested. The vehicle was searched. Deputy Windham discovered marijuana, a half bottle of Patron tequila, and small plastic bags containing additional substances during the search. Defendant informed Deputy Windham, after receiving Miranda warnings, that he fled the traffic stop because he had been smoking marijuana while driving.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 23, 2022, a grand jury indicted Defendant George Madison Kitchen, IV, on two counts. [ECF No. 1 (Sealed Indictment)]. He was charged with a count of Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, specifically methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Id. at 1. The indictment charged Defendant with one count of Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, specifically cocaine, a violation of the same statute. Id.
On February 10, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress. [ECF No. 29]. In the Motion, Defendant requests that the Court exclude "all items of evidence recovered as a result of the stop and prolonged detention of the Dodge Durango on July 20, 2022." Id. at 2. The asserted grounds for relief are that "law enforcement officer Matthew Sharp . . . did not have reasonable suspicion / probable cause to initiate the stop" and the stop "exceeded the allowable length" under binding law. [ECF Nos. 29 at 2; 29-1 at 9]. In essence, the Motion contends these events violated Defendant's right to "be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." [ECF No. 29 at 2].
The Government resists, explaining the initial traffic stop was valid because Officer Sharp observed Defendant commit a traffic violation - failure to stop at a red light - moments before. [ECF No. 33 at 4]. It further contends that the stop was not unlawfully prolonged because Officer Sharp smelled marijuana during a conversation with Defendant, which provided him with probable cause to conduct a search. Id. at 5. The Government asserts, in the alternative, that the initial stop is irrelevant because officers had probable cause to search the vehicle after Defendant fled the stop and Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in property ejected from the window. Id.
On May 11, 2022, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion. [ECF No. 41 (Minute Entry)]. It accepted body camera footage and testimony from officers at the hearing. Id. At the end, the Court informed the parties it agreed with the Government's positions on why the Motion to Suppress should be denied. For the reasons discussed below, which are the same as those stated on the record at the hearing, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
III. GOVERNING LAW
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "As a rule, searches and seizures are unreasonable [under the Fourth Amendment] unless accompanied by a warrant." United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 442 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001)). "The automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement permits the warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle by officers possessing probable cause." United States v. Soderman, 983 F.3d 369, 375 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
Probable cause exists if "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). To determine if probable cause exists, "we look at the 'totality of the circumstances.' " United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 776 (8th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). "Any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop." United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). Any marijuana smell "coming from a vehicle during a proper traffic stop gives an officer probable cause to search for drugs." United States v. Smith, 789 F.3d 923, 928-929 (8th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Initial Stop
Defendant's first contention is that Officer Sharp lacked an adequate reason to "initiate the stop." [ECF No. 29 at 2]. Officer Sharp watched Defendant drive through an intersection even though the vehicle was required to stop at a red light. Officer Sharp testified that when he stopped the Defendant, Defendant acknowledged that running the red light was the reason for the stop. This testimony, which the Court found credible at the suppression hearing and finds credible again, demonstrates the initial stop was supported by probable cause. United States v. Houston, 548 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 2004)). Given this, the Defendant's first argument must be rejected.
The Court expressly rejects Defendant's contention that the Court should limit its analysis of probable cause to the information that Officer Sharp reported to dispatch in the moments before initiating the stop. [ECF No. 29-1 at 7]. This is because "common sense and the relevant facts of what was known to the officer . . . inform whether an officer had probable cause." United States v. Manuel, 496 F. Supp. 3d 1263, 1267 (S.D. Iowa 2020) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006)).
B. Length of Stop
Defendant's next argument is that Officer Sharp improperly extended the stop in violation of Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). [ECF No. 29-1 at 9]. The Government resists, explaining that Officer Sharp asked Defendant routine questions and picked up on the smell of marijuana while conducting the standard tasks. [ECF No. 33]. The stop was not unlawfully extended for the reasons below.
"[A] lawfully-initiated traffic stop can become unlawful if it is unreasonably extended." United States v. Callison, 2 F.4th 1128, 1131 (8th Cir. 2021). "A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation . . . 'becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission' of issuing a ticket for the violation." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350-51, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005)). Officers may "conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop." United States v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407, 415 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). This includes "negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete the mission safely." United States v. Magallon, 984 F.3d 1263, 1278 (8th Cir. 2021). However, any "[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are - or reasonably should have been - completed." Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d at 415.
After stopping the vehicle, Officer Sharp approached the driver side window and requested several documents. Officer Sharp smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle while he spoke with Defendant. This provided Officer Sharp with probable cause to search the vehicle. Smith, 789 F.3d at 929 ("the smell of marijuana, along with the credible testimony by the officer, is sufficient to establish probable cause"). It was proper to extend the stop in this situation. Magallon, 984 F.3d at 1279 ("addressing the suspicion of drug activity require[s] time."). Put simply, Officer Sharp's conduct - returning to his cruiser, checking for information about Defendant's driver's license, and securing backup to execute a search - were not an improper extension of the stop, especially given that the stop only lasted eight minutes before Defendant fled. Smith, 789 F.3d at 929.
"After a law enforcement officer initiates a traffic stop, the officer 'may detain the offending motorist while the officer completes a number of routine but somewhat time-consuming tasks related to the traffic violation.' " United States v. Quintero-Felix, 714 F.3d 563, 567 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Barragan, 379 F.3d 524, 528 (8th Cir. 2004)). This includes "computerized checks of the vehicle's registration and the driver's license and criminal history, and the writing up of a citation or warning." Barragan, 379 F.3d at 528-29.
C. Alternative Grounds for Relief
The Government argues, in the alternative, that the dispute over the initial stop is irrelevant for two separate reasons: 1) Defendant fled after the initial stop; and 2) Defendant abandoned the property and forfeited any Fourth Amendment interest in it. Although the Court need not address the issues to fully resolve the Motion, these two alternative arguments would succeed and allow consideration of the drugs regardless of any decision the Court made on the initial stop.
i. Flight From Stop
After securing back up, Officer Sharp approached the driver side window and explained to Defendant that he intended to search the vehicle. Defendant responded by shifting the vehicle into drive and speeding away. He led Officers Hidalgo and Sharp, as well as PCSO Deputy Windham, on an extensive chase that eventually ended in Harrison County. Defendant's flight "provided independent grounds" for officers to arrest him and search the vehicle. Smith, 789 F.3d at 929 (citing United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1431 (8th Cir. 1995)). This alternative ground for relief would have allowed the officers to stop and search the vehicle regardless of the propriety of the initial stop.
ii. Abandonment
Well into the chase, either the Defendant or the passenger pushed a bag out of the passenger side window. The bag landed on the highway and exploded, spewing a cloud of white dust in front of Deputy Windham. Based on the objective facts, a reasonable officer would conclude that this conduct constituted physical relinquishment because the individuals were "attempting to disclaim ownership over this evidence so authorities could not trace the objects." United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a defendant throwing items "on the ground while being chased by police . . . suffices to establish the evidence was physically relinquished."). Thus, Defendant retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in the drugs given his relinquishment and it may be used by police as evidence.
D. Summary
The aforementioned discussion leads the Court to conclude that Officer Sharp had probable cause to believe that the Defendant had committed a traffic violation. Officer Sharp's investigation into the traffic violation led him to discover a marijuana odor, which provided him with probable cause to search the stopped vehicle and extend the stop to address it. Defendant escalated the situation by fleeing, an action that provided probable cause to stop and search the vehicle again. During the chase, the drugs were discarded, which constituted abandonment. This is sufficient to satisfy the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.