Bottom, 638 F.2d at 787; see also United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1975).United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1947, 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986).United States v. Fossler, 597 F.2d 478, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1979).
Brief for appellant at 38. In reaching the holding in Rokus that intent may be inferred from deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably likely to cause death, this court relied in part upon United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1985), in which the court approved the following jury instruction: "As a general rule it is reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of his knowing acts.
Colon v. United States, 516 U.S. 1105, 116 S.Ct. 900, 133 L.Ed.2d 834 (1996), and cert. denied sub nom. Sanchez v. United States, 516 U.S. 1148, 116 S.Ct. 1020, 134 L.Ed.2d 99 (1996); United States v. Miller, 478 F.2d 1315, 1320 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 851, 94 S.Ct. 144, 38 L.Ed.2d 100 (1973); United States v. Winters, 105 F.3d 200, 203-204 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Nguyen, 28 F.3d 477, 484 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290, 294-95 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104, 106 S.Ct. 1947, 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Wills, 88 F.3d 704, 716-18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1000, 117 S.Ct. 499, 136 L.Ed.2d 390 (1996); United States v. Arney, 248 F.3d 984, 987-90 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Reed, 61 F.3d 803, 805 n. 5 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1487-88 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 857 F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 846 (11th Cir. 1998). The Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits sanction the use of a modified Allen charge that directs majority as well as minority view jurors to reconsider their respective positions.
" Edlin, 523 So.2d at 45. In the case sub judice, the trial judge began reading the approved "Sharplin Charge" to the jury; he had almost finished the entire charge when he added to the "Sharplin Charge" the text of the Fifth Circuit "Allen Charge" approved in United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104, 106 S.Ct. 1947, 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986). Copies of both the "Sharplin Charge" and the "Fifth Circuit Charge" are found in Mississippi Jury Instructions: Criminal, C.116, C.117 (West 2d ed. 1992).
From circumstances around a defendant's voluntary and willful act, a jury may infer that the defendant intended a reasonably probable result of his or her act. See, People v. Bartall, 98 Ill.2d 294, 456 N.E.2d 59 (1983); People v. Getch, 50 N.Y.2d 456, 407 N.E.2d 425, 429 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1980). Consequently, the court in United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1985), approved the following instruction: "As a general rule it is reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of his knowing acts.
Westfield relies exclusively on caselaw considering whether instructions given to purportedly deadlocked juries were unduly coercive. See People v Walker, 504 Mich. 267; 934 N.W.2d 727 (2019); People v Vettese, 195 Mich.App. 235; 489 N.W.2d 514 (1992); Jenkins v United States, 380 U.S. 445; 85 S.Ct. 1059; 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965); United States v Kimmel, 777 F2d 290 (CA 5, 1985). To the extent that these cases apply in the context of Westfield's voir dire argument, they are factually distinguishable.