United States v. Kimmel

6 Citing cases

  1. Lowenfield v. Phelps

    817 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987)   Cited 101 times
    Holding that overwhelming evidence of competency to stand trial rendered harmless any potential error the court made in placing the burden of proof on the defendant to show incompetency rather than on the government to show competency

    Bottom, 638 F.2d at 787; see also United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1975).United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1947, 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986).United States v. Fossler, 597 F.2d 478, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1979).

  2. State v. Iromuanya

    272 Neb. 178 (Neb. 2006)   Cited 70 times
    In State v. Iromuanya, 272 Neb. 178, 191, 719 N.W.2d 263, 279 (2006), the defendant cited to cases from other jurisdictions which held that "purposefully elicited testimony directly indicating gang membership was highly prejudicial," citing Ex parte Thomas, 625 So. 2d 1156 (Ala. 1993).

    Brief for appellant at 38. In reaching the holding in Rokus that intent may be inferred from deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably likely to cause death, this court relied in part upon United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1985), in which the court approved the following jury instruction: "As a general rule it is reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of his knowing acts.

  3. State v. O'Neil

    261 Conn. 49 (Conn. 2002)   Cited 44 times
    Invoking supervisory authority in revising and directing specific version of “Chip Smith” charge in future cases

    Colon v. United States, 516 U.S. 1105, 116 S.Ct. 900, 133 L.Ed.2d 834 (1996), and cert. denied sub nom. Sanchez v. United States, 516 U.S. 1148, 116 S.Ct. 1020, 134 L.Ed.2d 99 (1996); United States v. Miller, 478 F.2d 1315, 1320 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 851, 94 S.Ct. 144, 38 L.Ed.2d 100 (1973); United States v. Winters, 105 F.3d 200, 203-204 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Nguyen, 28 F.3d 477, 484 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290, 294-95 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104, 106 S.Ct. 1947, 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Wills, 88 F.3d 704, 716-18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1000, 117 S.Ct. 499, 136 L.Ed.2d 390 (1996); United States v. Arney, 248 F.3d 984, 987-90 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Reed, 61 F.3d 803, 805 n. 5 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1487-88 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 857 F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 846 (11th Cir. 1998). The Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits sanction the use of a modified Allen charge that directs majority as well as minority view jurors to reconsider their respective positions.

  4. Bolton v. State

    643 So. 2d 942 (Miss. 1994)   Cited 7 times
    In Bolton, when reading the Sharplin instruction to the jury, the circuit court inserted language regarding the costs of trial and the possibility of impaneling another jury.

    " Edlin, 523 So.2d at 45. In the case sub judice, the trial judge began reading the approved "Sharplin Charge" to the jury; he had almost finished the entire charge when he added to the "Sharplin Charge" the text of the Fifth Circuit "Allen Charge" approved in United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104, 106 S.Ct. 1947, 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986). Copies of both the "Sharplin Charge" and the "Fifth Circuit Charge" are found in Mississippi Jury Instructions: Criminal, C.116, C.117 (West 2d ed. 1992).

  5. State v. Rokus

    240 Neb. 613 (Neb. 1992)   Cited 17 times

    From circumstances around a defendant's voluntary and willful act, a jury may infer that the defendant intended a reasonably probable result of his or her act. See, People v. Bartall, 98 Ill.2d 294, 456 N.E.2d 59 (1983); People v. Getch, 50 N.Y.2d 456, 407 N.E.2d 425, 429 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1980). Consequently, the court in United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1985), approved the following instruction: "As a general rule it is reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of his knowing acts.

  6. People v. Richter

    No. 355577 (Mich. Ct. App. Sep. 22, 2022)

    Westfield relies exclusively on caselaw considering whether instructions given to purportedly deadlocked juries were unduly coercive. See People v Walker, 504 Mich. 267; 934 N.W.2d 727 (2019); People v Vettese, 195 Mich.App. 235; 489 N.W.2d 514 (1992); Jenkins v United States, 380 U.S. 445; 85 S.Ct. 1059; 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965); United States v Kimmel, 777 F2d 290 (CA 5, 1985). To the extent that these cases apply in the context of Westfield's voir dire argument, they are factually distinguishable.