Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Andre M. Espinosa, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Thongchone Vongdeng, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Amber Collins, Erin J. Radekin, Esq., counsel for defendant Somaly Siv, Michael L. Chastaine, Esq., and counsel for defendant Jaffrey Brown, Todd D. Leras, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on October 8, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until December 10, 2015 and to exclude time between October 8, 2015 and December 10, 2015 under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
JOHN R. MANNING, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Sacramento, CA. Attorney for Defendant THONGCHONE VONGDENG
ERIN J. RADEKIN, Attorney for Defendant, Amber Collins MICHAEL L. CHASTAINE, Attorney for Defendant, Somaly Siv TODD D. LERAS, Attorney for Defendant, Jaffrey Brown Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney, ANDRÉ M. ESPINOSA, Assistant United States Attorney
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. The government intends to produce approximately 50, 000 pages of discovery by mid October.
b. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the anticipated discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.
c. Counsel for the defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of October 8, 2015, to December 10, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that provision of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER