According to the legislative history, Congress enacted § 666 “to protect the integrity of the vast sums of money distributed through Federal programs from theft, fraud, and undue influence by bribery.” United States v. Keen, 676 F.3d 981, 990 (11th Cir.2012) (quoting S.Rep. No. 98–225, at 370 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3511). Put simply, Congress's purpose was to ensure the integrity of the covered entities receiving federal assistance.
As the Eleventh Circuit recently noted when presented with this argument, “[n]owhere does the statutory text either mention or imply an additional qualifying requirement that the person be authorized to act specifically with respect to the entity's funds.” United States v. Keen, 676 F.3d 981, 989–90 (11th Cir.2012). The statute merely requires that the individual be “authorized to act on behalf of another person or government.”
Despite numerous challenges to the constitutionality of § 666, the Supreme Court and other lower courts have consistently held that the statute is a proper exercise of Congress's authority. Seeid. at 604–08, 124 S.Ct. 1941 (rejecting a facial challenge to § 666 asserting that it was unconstitutional under the Spending Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause because it failed to require proof of a connection between the bribe or kickback and federal funds); Salinas , 522 U.S. at 60–61, 118 S.Ct. 469 (holding that "there is no serious doubt about the constitutionality of § 666(b)(1)(B) as applied" to a sheriff's deputy who accepted bribes in return for allowing a federal prisoner held in a county jail to have contact visits with his wife and girlfriend); United States v. Fernandez , 722 F.3d 1, 11 (rejecting an as-applied challenge to § 666 based upon the Necessary and Proper Clause); United States v. Keen , 676 F.3d 981, 991 (11th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a defendant's contention that § 666 would be unconstitutional under the Spending and Necessary and Proper Clauses unless its application was limited to local governmental employees who had authority over federal funds); United States v. Hines , 541 F.3d 833, 835–36 (8th Cir. 2008) (rejecting defendant's as-applied challenge and finding that § 666 as drafted reflected that Congress had acted with a legitimate purpose and rational means); United States v. Spano , 401 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting an as-applied challenge to § 666 under both the Spending Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause); United States v. Bynum , 327 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a facial challenge to § 666 because there was no nexus between the criminal action and federal funds); United States v. Edgar , 304 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2002) ("[A] basis for the enactment of § 666 may be found in Congress's authority, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, to protect its capacity
We review de novo the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Keen, 676 F.3d 981, 989 (11th Cir.2012), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 573, 184 L.Ed.2d 377 (2012). A conviction will be upheld “unless the jury could not have found the defendant guilty under any reasonable construction of the evidence.”
Id . at 605, 124 S.Ct. 1941.United States v. Fernandez , 722 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Keen , 676 F.3d 981, 990 (11th Cir. 2012) ("[E]ven if these thieves and cheats are not specifically using their positions to defraud the entity employing them, it cannot be denied that their fraudulent conduct poses a threat to the integrity of the entity, which in turn poses a threat to the federal funds entrusted to that entity."). 522 U.S. 52, 61, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997).
In considering the purpose of section 666 to protect "the integrity of entities receiving substantial sums of federal funds" and the statute's "expansive, unqualified language," the court has repeatedly rejected statutory constructions aimed at narrowing section 666 ’s scope. United States v. Keen , 676 F.3d 981, 990–91 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation and citations omitted) (collecting cases in which the court has rejected attempts to narrow the scope of section 666 ). Consistent with the views of our sister Circuits, we hold that McDonnell does not disturb this court's holding in McNair and we do not read into section 666 limitations unsupported by the language of the statute.
The evidence proved that Rockefeller and Darryl Williams paid White to exert his influence as a County Commissioner, who had a vote in the allocation of County funds to the Sheriff's Office, to pressure the Sheriff's Office to select Tri-County. See United States v. Keen, 676 F.3d 981, 994 (11th Cir. 2012) ("[T]o qualify as an agent of an entity, an individual need only be authorized to act on behalf of that entity."). The jury also could reasonably have found that White was an agent of the County when he affected the vote of the Transportation Commission on the Tri-County application.
With regard to the first principle, "the district court must measure the defendant's role against [his] relevant conduct, that is, the conduct for which [he] has been held accountable" in calculating his base offense level. United States v. Keen, 676 F.3d 981, 997 (11th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 573 (2012). As for the second principle, the district court may make an assessment of relative culpability among the various participants in a criminal offense that were involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant.
The legal interpretation of “benefits” directly impacts the scope of § 666 as a whole. See, e.g., United States v. Keen, 676 F.3d 981, 990 (11th Cir. 2012) (describing that the Supreme Court's “recognition of [Congress'] ambitious objective . . . has led the Court repeatedly to reject statutory constructions aimed at narrowing § 666's scope, in favor of a broad reading”). Notably, however, the Jordans do not frame their argument regarding “benefits” as a jurisdictional or constitutional attack on the scope of § 666.
"The recognition of that ambitious objective, in turn, has led the [Supreme] Court repeatedly to reject statutory constructions aimed at narrowing § 666's scope, in favor of a broad reading." United States v. Keen, 676 F.3d 981, 990 (11th Cir. 2012). Next, the Defendants maintain that the indictment fails to state federal program bribery because it lacks any allegation that Robinson was acting as an "agent" of the state of Alabama.