Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, HENRY Z. CARBAJAL III, Assistant United States Attorney, Fresno, CA. Attorneys for the United States of America
HARRY M. DRANDELL, Counsel for Defendant. JOSE EDUARDO JERONIMO
STIPULATION TO SET CHANGE OF PLEA HEARING; FINDINGS AND ORDER
ANTHONY W. ISHII, Senior District Judge.
STIPULATION
The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference for five defendants, including Jose Eduardo Jeronimo, on June 24, 2013 at 1:00 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant Jose Eduardo Jeronimo now moves to vacate the status conference as to him only, and set a change of plea hearing for June 17, 2013 at 10:00 a.m. before Senior District Judge Anthony W. Ishii, and to exclude time between the date of this stipulation and June 17, 2013 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv). The government does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The parties have reached a plea agreement in advance of the June 24, 2013 status conference, the plea agreement has been filed with the Court, and the parties' first available date for a change of plea hearing is on June 17, 2013 at 10:00 a.m.
b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government does not object to the continuance, or the setting of the change of plea hearing.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to June 17, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.