Opinion
No. 1: 17-cr-0342-05
01-16-2019
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SIHEE JAMISON
SEALED MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court are Defendant Sihee Jamison's ("Defendant") motions to suppress evidence and to quash Count 1 of the indictment. (Doc 144.) Specifically, Defendant argues that he was detained or arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that any statements made after his arrest and detention must be suppressed. Defendant further argues that the conspiracy count of the indictment must be dismissed because the Government has not demonstrated a sufficient connection between Defendant and his alleged co-conspirators to support the conspiracy charge. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motions will be denied.
I. Background
On November 1, 2017, Defendant, along with six other co-defendants, were jointly charged in a forty-three (43) count indictment. (Doc. 3.) Defendant was charged at Count 1, Conspiracy; Count 2, Distribution of Heroin; Count 3, Distribution of Cocaine; Count 4, Distribution of Heroin; Count 5, Distribution of Heroin; Count 6, Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine Base; and Count 19, Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine Base and Cocaine Hydrochloride. On September 9, 2018, Defendant filed the instant motion to suppress evidence and quash Count 1 of the indictment. Upon consideration of Defendant's motion, the court held an evidentiary hearing on November 27, 2018. After the evidentiary hearing, the parties submitted briefs in support of and in opposition to Defendant's motion. Accordingly, the matter is ripe for disposition.
The court finds the following facts based upon the evidentiary hearing held on November 27, 2018. In 2016, a confidential informant (CI) notified the York City Police Department ("York") that Defendant was involved in the sale and distribution of heroin and cocaine. (Doc. 182, p. 5.) In response, York arranged for the CI to conduct controlled buys of drugs from Defendant. (Id.) The controlled buys occurred on March 2, 2016, for a sum of heroin, March 23, 2016, for a sum of cocaine, June 9, 2016, for a sum of heroin, and June 15, 2016, for a sum of heroin. (Id. at 6-10.) York did not immediately arrest Defendant based on these controlled buys because they were conducting an ongoing investigation into a larger drug distribution network. (Id. at 11.)
Trooper Wolfe testified that two incident reports contained the phrase "[t]he cocaine was entered into evidence," when the substance actually entered into evidence was heroin. (Doc. 182, pp. 32-33; Government's Exs. 1, 4.) Trooper Wolfe confirmed that this was a typographical error on his part and the remainder of the incident reports and lab testing confirm that the substances were heroin rather than cocaine. (Id.)
On July 27, 2016, Trooper Shawn Wolfe ("Trooper Wolfe") approached Defendant at "Sneaker Villa," a shoe store in York, Pennsylvania while Defendant was purchasing shoes. (Doc. 182, p. 11.) Although Trooper Wolfe told Defendant that he was not under arrest, Trooper Wolfe placed Defendant into handcuffs, informed him of his Miranda rights, and stated that he was being detained because of the four previous controlled buys. (Id. at 11-12.) After being detained, Defendant consented to a search of his vehicle and residence. (Id. at 15-17; Government Exs. 5-6.) During said search, Trooper Wolfe discovered a sum of cocaine, pills, and approximately $3,000.00 in U.S. currency. (Id. at 16-18.) At this point, Trooper Wolfe released Defendant. (Id. at 18.) At the hearing, Trooper Wolfe testified that he did not arrest Defendant during the detention at Sneaker Villa because Defendant had indicated a willingness to cooperate with the ongoing investigation. (Id. at 14, 18.) Despite initially displaying a willingness to cooperate, Defendant eventually ceased communications with Trooper Wolfe. (Id. at 18-19.) On October 26, 2016, an arrest warrant was issued for Defendant based on the previous controlled buys and the drugs and U.S. currency discovered at Defendant's residence. (Id. at 20; Government Ex. 8.)
On November 17, 2016, officers executed the warrant at 222 Stuart Avenue in York County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 182, p. 20-21; Government's Ex. 11.) Defendant was found in a bedroom on the property where his personal possessions and those of his girlfriend were discovered alongside drugs and drug paraphernalia. (Id. at 23, 42.) Based on the drugs and other items found during the arrest, Trooper Wolfe obtained a search warrant for the residence. (Id. at 21; Government's Ex. 9.) At that time, the officers searched the property and found cocaine, marijuana, and other drug paraphernalia. (Id. at 21; Government's Ex. 11.)
II. Legal Standard
The United States Constitution guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "On a motion to suppress, the government bears the burden of showing that each individual act constituting a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment was reasonable." United States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2005). "The applicable burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974).
III. Discussion
A. Probable cause to arrest Defendant
Although there is little debate on this issue, the court must determine, as a threshold matter, whether Defendant was being briefly detained for an investigative stop or if he was subjected to a custodial interrogation which equates to an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. To determine whether an individual who has not been arrested is in custody, the Court must determine "whether there is a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." United States v. Morales, No. 18-cr-46, 2018 WL 6173345, *9 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2018) (quoting United States v. McNeil, 416 F. App'x 227, 228 (3d Cir. 2011)). In determining whether a defendant was in custody, courts examine five factors:
(1) whether the officers told the suspect he was under arrest or free to leave; (2) the location or physical surroundings of the interrogation; (3) the length of the interrogation; (4) whether the officers used coercive tactics such as hostile tones of voice, the display of weapons, or physical restraint of the suspect's movement; and (5) whether the suspect voluntarily submitted to questioning.United States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 359-60 (3d Cir. 2006).
At the suppression hearing, both Trooper Wolfe and the Government waffled when asked whether Defendant's detention rose to the level of an arrest. (Doc. 182, p. 12.) Despite being told he was not "under arrest" in the sense that he was being taken to the police station and processed according to York policy, Defendant was physically prevented from leaving, told he was being investigated for drug-related crimes, handcuffed, Mirandized, and questioned by police. (Id. at 12-13.) These facts, taken together, establish that Defendant was restrained to "the degree associated with a formal arrest." Morales, 2018 WL 6173345 at *9; see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100 (2005); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 45 (stating that handcuffing a suspect typically equates to an arrest unless exigent circumstances exist that would potentially endanger the safety of investigating officers). Accordingly, the Government must demonstrate probable cause for the custodial detention of Defendant at Sneaker Villa.
Arguing that the Trooper Wolfe lacked the requisite probable cause to take him into custody, Defendant states that the Government had no evidence that he was engaging in criminal activity at the time of his detention at Sneaker Villa and that the prior controlled buys were insufficient to establish probable cause to detain Defendant at a later date. In support of this argument, Defendant notes that he was not indicted in the matter sub judice for drug-related offenses stemming from the controlled buys and that Trooper Wolfe cited no conduct other than the controlled buys which led him to believe that Defendant had committed a crime on July 27, 2016.
Defendant cites no case law to support his claim that the probable cause to arrest him based on the controlled buys evaporated between the date of the controlled buy and his eventual arrest. The Government does not argue that it had probable cause to arrest Defendant based on his actions at Sneaker Villa; instead, the Government asserts that the probable cause from the controlled buys was sufficient to detain Defendant at that later date.
Regarding arrests without warrants generally, the Supreme Court has held that:
Law enforcement officers may find it wise to seek arrest warrants where practicable to do so, and their judgments about probable cause may be
more readily accepted where backed by a warrant issued by a magistrate. But we decline to transform this judicial preference into a constitutional rule when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather than encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like.United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976). In determining whether a warrantless search was supported by probable cause, the Third Circuit has concluded that:
[I]n passing on a warrantless search a court must determine whether at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it—whether at that moment, the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had been or was committing an offense.United States v. Harris, 482 F.2d 1115, 1117 (3d Cir. 1973) (emphasis added). Facts that would support a finding of probable cause do not cease to do so simply because they did not occur immediately before Defendant was taken into custody. United States v. Kellam, No. 14-cr-323, 2015 WL 6560637, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2015), aff'd, No. 17-2300, 2018 WL 4677556 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2018) (holding that the three controlled drug purchases occurring nearly one month prior to the defendant's arrest provided probable cause to arrest the defendant in a public place).
It is well settled that probable cause can become "stale" in that it is too attenuated from the arrest to lead officers to believe that the arrestee was still involved in the criminal activity supporting the arrest. Compare United States v. Gallo, 110 F. App'x 265 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a single controlled buy effectuated 20 days before arrest was not stale for purposes of establishing probable cause), with United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that information that was more than 18 months old was stale and should not have been used as a basis for finding probable cause). However, such a determination is a factual inquiry and is not based on a rote application of temporal benchmarks. In the present case, although the last controlled buy was approximately 42 days before the relevant arrest, it was the last in a series of consecutive controlled buys that occurred over a period of approximately four months. See Gallo, 110 F. App'x at 268 (noting that controlled buys add great weight to a confidential informant's tip) (citing United States v. McKinney, 143 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 1998)); see also United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 420 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[W]hen an activity is of a protracted and continuous nature, 'the passage of time becomes less significant.'" (quoting United States v. Tehfe, 722 F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., Sanchez v. United States, 466 U.S. 904 (1984) (internal quotation omitted))). Accordingly, because Trooper Wolfe based the arrest on a series of ongoing controlled buys that demonstrated a continuing pattern of criminal activity, probable cause existed to arrest Defendant at the time he was taken into custody on July 27, 2016.
B. Searches subsequent to arrest
Defendant's second argument requires little discussion given the court's holding that his arrest was supported by probable cause. Defendant argues that the search of his vehicle and residence on July 27, 2016, were unlawful. Simply, these searches were valid because Defendant consented to them verbally and in writing. In order for a consent search to pass constitutional muster, the consent provided must be (1) voluntary and (2) given by a person with the authority to consent to the search. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223, (1973). Voluntariness is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 223; United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 279 (3d Cir. 2009).
It is well settled that an officer may perform a pat-down when making a lawful arrest. United States v. Jackson, 682 F. App'x 86, 87 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (officers have the authority to search the person of an arrestee incident to a lawful arrest)). Because the court concluded that the arrest was supported by probable cause, Trooper Wolfe's initial pat-down search of Defendant was lawful.
There is no contention that Defendant was not properly Mirandized or that he did not understand his Miranda rights as read to him. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (holding that a defendant may waive his Miranda rights if he does so voluntarily and with adequate comprehension of those rights). Defendant's signature on the Miranda waiver forms (Government Exs. 5, 6) is strong evidence that he voluntarily gave up his rights and consented to a search of his car and premises. United States v. Pasca, No. 07-cr-182, 2008 WL 1752239, *17 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2008); see also United States v. Carney, 06-cr-350, 2007 WL 1864633, *15 (W.D. Pa. June 27, 2007) ("The [waiver of rights form and consent to search form] executed by defendant indicate that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and that he voluntarily consented [to the search]"); United States v. Giampa, 904 F.Supp. 235, 276 (D.N.J. 1995) ("The initialing of the Miranda waiver form by [the suspect] and his signing of the consent to search form were inconsistent with a finding that his will was overborne"). Accordingly, the court finds that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and, thus, the search of Defendant's vehicle and residence were lawful.
Defendant also argues that the evidence discovered on November 27, 2016, at 222 Stuart Avenue should be suppressed because the arrest warrant executed that day is based solely on the contraband found during the July 27, 2016 search. Because the court holds that the July 27, 2016 search was valid and lawful, the evidence obtained therefrom was properly used as a basis for the arrest warrant.
Finally, Defendant argues that "[t]he fact that [Defendant] was inside the residence [at 222 Stuart Avenue] is not enough to prove dominion and control [over the contraband]." (Doc. 185, p. 8 (citing U.S. v. Bates, 462 Fed. App'x 244 (3d Cir. 2012).) Initially, the court notes that Bates is inapposite due to its procedural posture alone. In Bates, the defendant challenged his conviction in a motion for acquittal due to insufficiency of the evidence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. As noted by the Government in its brief, the issue of dominion and control is one for the jury rather than for the court at the suppression stage. United States v. Cunningham, 517 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Constructive possession exists if an individual knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons. Constructive possession necessarily requires both dominion and control over an object and knowledge of that object's existence." (quoting United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir.1992))). In Bates, the Third Circuit found it relevant that the "there [was] no evidence [the defendant] kept possessions in the house, no evidence he was in the house when the heroin was in the house, and no evidence he was in close proximity to the drugs," and, further, that the defendant's "fingerprints were not found in the room containing the drugs, there is no evidence that he was in the room containing the drugs, no evidence he knew of the heroin, and the packaging [defendant] possessed for the crack was different than the packaging discovered with the heroin." Bates, 462 F. App'x at 251-52. Conversely, here, Defendant appeared to not only have access to the house itself, but appeared to reside there regularly, and was actually inside the room where drugs were discovered. Again, this is all evidence that the jury, or the court upon a motion for acquittal, must consider in determining whether Defendant had sufficient dominion and control over the drugs at issue, but the facts presented do not warrant suppression of evidence found at 222 Stuart Avenue.
In United States v. Lopez, 441 F. App'x 910, 916 n.11 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit noted that, although the issue of dominion and control is normally a question of evidentiary relevancy, the District Court reasonably construed the defendant's suppression motion to attack the Government's probable cause to arrest him based on the defendant's dominion and control over the contraband. Here, no such argument could be inferred. The contraband that Defendant seeks to suppress was the result of a search warrant rather than a justification for probable cause. Accordingly, the court cannot infer that his argument is anything other than a question for the jury. --------
C. Motion to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment
Defendant argues that Count 1 of the indictment, conspiracy, should be dismissed because the Government has not presented sufficient evidence to prove that he was a member of the conspiracy. To the contrary, "[i]t is well-established that an indictment is enough to call for a trial of the charge on the merits so long as it is facially sufficient." Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956); United States v. Gillette, 738 F. 3d 63, 74 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation omitted).
An indictment is facially sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and (3) allows the defendant to show with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction in the event of a subsequent prosecution. We have explained that, in general, an indictment will satisfy these requirements where it informs the defendant of the statute he is charged with violating, lists the elements of a violation under the statute, and specifies the time period during which the violations occurred.Gillette, 738 F. 3d at 74 (internal citations omitted). The indictment, and the portion thereof charging Defendant with conspiracy, satisfies all the requirements set forth in Gillette. (See generally, Doc. 3.) A suppression hearing does not supplant the purpose of a jury trial. The court need not determine at this point if the Government has produced sufficient evidence to prove that Defendant was part of the alleged conspiracy; such is the province of the jury or this court upon a motion for a judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to quash Count 1 of the indictment will be denied.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Defendant was lawfully arrested, that he was fully advised of and waived his Miranda rights, and that he had the authority to give and voluntarily gave consent for the law enforcement officials to search his vehicle and residence. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to suppress will be denied in its entirety. Additionally, because the sufficiency of evidence is a determination to be made at trial, Defendant's motion to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment will be denied. An appropriate order follows.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge Dated: January 16, 2019