” United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 175 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc)). “The inquiry is simply whether, looking at the elements of the offense alone, we can know that the government proved that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force against another.”

” United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 182 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Cohen, 888 F.3d at 681) (internal quotation marks omitted)

” United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 183 (4th Cir. 2024). Motions to substitute counsel have been denied when made as far as ten days before the start of trial.

But that does not mean that any reference to an uncharged offense, no matter how brief and attenuated it may be, compels a mistrial." United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 192-93 (4th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). In this case, there was a single, brief reference to the outstanding warrant; the warrant was not central to the government's case; the court immediately gave a curative instruction; and the evidence against Banks-including the pictures and text messages on his cell phone-was overwhelming.

Further, as it currently stands, "it is firmly established that a jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge[s], so long as that conduct has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 191 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original); see Guidelines § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (instructing sentencing court to consider "all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant"). Indeed, "[s]entencing judges may find facts relevant to deter[]mining a Guidelines range by a preponderance

The magistrate judge also did not abuse his discretion by determining that Grier would have to view discovery through standby counsel. United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2024) (noting that "district courts have broad discretion to decide how much assistance, if any, standby counsel may provide").

The Petitioner is not entitled to make pro se filings while she is represented by counsel; nor may Ms. VanPelt advocate for Petitioner without having appeared as counsel in this case. See generally United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 184 (4th Cir. 2024) (a defendant has no right to standby counsel or hybrid representation); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 84-4, 84-8 (addressing the criminal offense of unauthorized practice of law). Moreover, the argument that the United States' Response was untimely filed is meritless.

The Petitioner is not entitled to make pro se filings while she is represented by counsel; nor may Ms. VanPelt advocate for Petitioner without having appeared as counsel in this case. See generally United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 184 (4th Cir. 2024) (a defendant has no right to standby counsel or hybrid representation); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 84-4, 84-8 (addressing the criminal offense of unauthorized practice of law). The Court accepts the Government's Response, which was filed one day late, as timely.

United States v. Pérez-Rodríguez, 13 F.4th 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Pugh, 937 F.3d 108, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Daniels, 915 F.3d 148, 152, 160, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2019); United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 177 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Hill, 63 F.4th 335, 362 (5th Cir. 2023); United States v. Alebbini, 979 F.3d 537, 546 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. States, 72 F.4th 778, 789 n.7 (7th Cir. 2023); United States v. Dennis, 81 F.4th 764, 768 (8th Cir. 2023); United States v. Howald, 104 F.4th 732, 742 (9th Cir. 2024); United States v. Faulkner, 950 F.3d 670, 676 (10th Cir. 2019); Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Hite, 769 F.3d 1154, 1164 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2014). See also United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 851 (2022) (saying that "[w]hat exactly constitutes a substantial step is beyond the scope" of the case before it but finding it sufficient for present purposes to observe that the parties agreed "that a substantial step demands something more than 'mere preparation'").