Opinion
20-30214
09-15-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADAM CHRISTOPHER HORTY, Defendant-Appellant.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Argued and Submitted June 9, 2022 Seattle, Washington
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho D.C. No. 2:18-cr-00293-RCT-1 Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judge, Presiding
Before: IKUTA and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON, [**] District Judge.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Adam Christopher Horty appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle. He also challenges his convictions for distribution of, and possession with intent to distribute, methamphetamine, his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, and his sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court did not err in denying Horty's motion to suppress. There is no evidence that the officers conducted an inventory search as a pretext to find evidence of a crime, or that the officers were searching for such evidence in Horty's car. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 889 F.3d 1120, 1128 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). Rather, the testimony of the officers demonstrates that they waited to confront Horty in his vehicle simply to prevent him from interfering with the search of his house. The subsequent inventory search of Horty's vehicle fully complied with the county sheriff's policy, and officers had probable cause to seize the items found in the car. See id. at 1128 n.2; Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). Therefore, the methamphetamine, cash, pills, and drug paraphernalia found in Horty's car were properly seized as part of a valid inventory search.
Further, the district court did not err in excusing defense witnesses Kimber Blegen and Jacqueline Storjohann from testifying at trial. The district court could conclude, based on its knowledge of the case, that Blegen and Storjohann would have been questioned about their presence at the residence and the illegal items found there, and such testimony could subject both of them to criminal liability. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding the witnesses could "legitimately refuse to answer essentially all relevant questions." United States v. Tsui, 646 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).
Finally, the district court did not err, let alone plainly err, in imposing the obstruction of justice enhancement under section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines. The district court made specific findings that (1) Horty gave "blatantly false" testimony, (2) on matters "material to his sales and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and his knowing possession of firearms as a previously convicted felon," (3) in an intentional "effort to sway the jury to adopt his false view of the evidence." This meets the district court's burden of making specific findings that "(1) the defendant gave false testimony, (2) on a material matter, (3) with willful intent," as required to impose an obstruction of justice enhancement for perjury. United States v. Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1993) (holding that a district court's similar statements regarding the factual predicates for a finding of perjury was sufficient to impose an enhancement under section 3C.1). Contrary to the dissent, the Supreme Court has long rejected the argument that imposing an enhancement based on such findings "interferes with [the] right to testify," or "distorts [the] decision whether to testify or remain silent," because "a defendant's right to testify does not include a right to commit perjury," and a district court's duty to find the elements of perjury (as described above) is an adequate safeguard. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 96-97. Because "a district court is not required to enumerate specifically which portions of a defendant's testimony are false to justify an enhancement for obstruction of justice," United States v. Acuna, 9 F.3d 1442, 1445 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted), the district court here had no obligation to provide further details regarding the testimony at issue.
In light of this binding precedent, which is consistent with Supreme Court case law, see Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95, we decline the dissent's urging to vacate the district court's decision based on inconsistent out-of-circuit precedent. See, e.g., Dissent at 3-4.
AFFIRMED.
PREGERSON, District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I concur in the majority's disposition as to the inventory search and Fifth Amendment invocations, I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion regarding the propriety of the district court's obstruction of justice enhancement.
It is a well-settled principle of federal sentencing law that district courts must explain their sentencing decisions with sufficient detail "to permit 'meaningful' appellate review." United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). That obligation also requires a district court to state its reasons for rejecting nonfrivolous arguments raised by a defendant. Id. at 821. We have applied this longstanding principle across a wide range of sentencing contexts. See, e.g., Carty, 520 F.3d at 992-93 (initial sentencing); United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2013) (request for reduction of sentence); Emmett, 749 F.3d at 820 (termination of supervised release). Although we have not explicitly stated that district courts are bound by the same duty when applying an obstruction of justice enhancement, other circuits have often done so. See, e.g., United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 712-13 (6th Cir. 1998) (vacating obstruction enhancement, in part, because district court did not provide "any explanation of why the perjury was material") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v. Watts, 896 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018) (concluding that district court's decision to apply the enhancement "included sufficient explanation" because the court explained "how Watts's specific conduct was designed to hinder the investigation and thereby warranted the enhancement"); cf. United States v. Molina, 172 F.3d 1048, 1058 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that district court's factual findings "must be sufficiently detailed to allow meaningful appellate review.").
United States v. Acuna, 9 F.3d 1442, 1445 (9th Cir. 1993), is not to the contrary. The majority correctly observes that in Acuna, we held that a district court need not identify specific portions of a defendant's testimony when imposing an obstruction enhancement. Acuna, 9 F.3d at 1445. Contrary to the majority's characterization, however, Acuna did not carve out an exception to the general rule that a district court must sufficiently explain its decisions, or otherwise suggest that a district court need only recite certain magic words when applying an obstruction enhancement, without any need for "further details" or explanation. Indeed, the district court in Acuna did explain, in detail, why it believed the defendant testified falsely. 9 F.3d at 1445. Specifically, the district court reasoned that the defendant's testimony was "clearly false and unworthy of belief" because his testimony contradicted tape recorded statements that he made to undercover agents during the course of the conspiracy. Id.
While I agree that United State v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) informs this Court's analysis of a district court's perjury findings, I disagree that Dunnigan controls here. Dunnigan did not discuss in detail the sufficiency of a district court's explanation of its reasoning, but rather addressed the question "whether the Constitution permits a court to enhance a defendant's sentence" on the basis that "the defendant committed perjury at trial." 507 U.S. at 88-89. Answering in the affirmative, the Court held that a district court must "make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice. . . that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a perjury finding." Id. at 95. In my view, the Court did not suggest that a district court can satisfy this obligation absent specific reasoning, or that there is an obstruction enhancement exception to the general principle that district courts must provide sufficient information to allow for meaningful appellate review. Had it done so, this Court's analysis in Acuna would have been completely unnecessary. Our decision in Acuna does not, however, cite to Dunnigan at all. Moreover, the district court in Dunnigan did provide some reasoning, explaining that the "defendant was untruthful at trial" because she "denied her involvement when it was clear from the evidence . . . that she was involved in the conspiracy alleged in the indictment." Id. at 91. Furthermore, as discussed above, our sister circuits that have addressed this issue have, consistent with our general approach in sentencing cases, required some explanation for the imposition of an obstruction enhancement, even post Dunnigan. See, e.g., McRae, 156 F.3d at 712-13; Watts, 896 F.3d at 1254; cf. Molina, 172 F.3d at 1058.
Here, by contrast, the district court provided no explanation or details in support of its conclusion that Horty testified falsely. Instead, the district court found, generally, that Horty's testimony was "blatantly false" because "[the court] did not believe [Horty], nor did the jury as evidenced by the guilty verdicts on all five counts." With such limited information, the majority cannot possibly "meaningfully review" the district court's imposition of an obstruction enhancement. By nevertheless affirming the district court's decision, the majority gives rise to an outcome we have previously sought to avoid, "the unintended consequence of chilling a criminal defendant's willingness to take the stand and give testimony in his or her defense." United States v. Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d 819, 823 (9th Cir. 2014).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent, in part. I would vacate the obstruction enhancement and remand for resentencing.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.