Opinion
CRIMINAL ACTION 13-147
09-15-2023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL HOLLY
SECTION “B” (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is pro se Petitioner Michael Holly's second Motion for Sentencing Transcript (Rec. Doc. 95). For the following reasons, the Motion is DISMISSED as moot and repetitive.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Pro se Petitioner Michael Holly (“Holly”) moves this court for a second time to provide him a free sentencing transcript. See Rec. Doc. 95; see also Rec. Doc. 93. Approximately a year and a half ago, in February 2022, Holly filed a similar Motion for Sentencing Transcript (“2022 Motion”). See Rec. Doc. 93. In the 2022 Motion, Holly stated he was “unable[] to pay the fees” for his sentencing transcript, but that he needed the transcript “for legal purposes on [his] appeal” because he did not recall a part of his sentence. Id. However, despite stating he needed his transcript for appeal purposes, Holly had not filed any post-conviction actions. See Rec. Doc. 94 at 5. For that reason, this Court denied Holly's 2022 Motion. See id. 3-5.
Now, like in the 2022 Motion, Holly is requesting a free sentencing transcript without any post-conviction actions pending before this Court or the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit. Compare Rec. Doc. 95, with Rec. Doc. 93, and Rec. Doc. 94. As basis, he states a need to “proceed forward” with his case (perhaps filing some future, unknown post-conviction action). See Rec. Doc. 95.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
As explained in the denial of Holly's 2022 Motion, a movant is not entitled to a free sentencing transcript simply because he “needs them to formulate a claim[.]” Rec. Doc. 94 at 4 (citing Brown v. United States, 428 F.2d 1385, 1385 (5th Cir. 1971)). We also explained that being an indigent, without more, does not entitle a movant to a free sentencing transcript. See id. at 4-5 (citing United States v. Herrera, 474 F.2d 1049, 1049-50 (5th Cir. 1973). Rather, to be entitled to a free sentencing transcript, Holly would need to show that he has a “pending matter before [a] Court for which this Court could consider providing the transcripts as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 753(f).” United States v. Skipper, No. CRIM.A. 93-315, 1996 WL 560353, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 1996).
The full text of 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) was provided in our first denial of Holly's 2022 Motion. See Rec. Doc. 94 at 4.
Again, Holly does not have any post-conviction actions pending before this Court or before the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit. His request is not related to any pending proceeding. Thus, just as Holly's basis for requesting his sentencing transcript in the 2022 Motion was not enough (see Rec. Docs. 93 and 94), his similar basis now - to “do the proper case work towards his case” and not having “any funds to pay” - is not enough. This is true even though we construe Holly's Motion liberally, as it was filed Pro se. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994).
Holly also did not have any post-conviction actions pending before this Court when he filed his 2022 motion. See Rec. Doc. 94 at 5.
Additionally, because Holly's instant motion is duplicative of the 2022 Motion, we must warn: Holly's Pro se status does not relieve him from complying with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law, including avoidance of filing repetitive, vexatious, or frivolous motions. See NCO Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harper-Horsley, No. CIV.A. 07-4247, 2008 WL 2277843, at *3 (E.D. La. May 29, 2008) (citations omitted). Engaging in such behavior could cause the imposition of sanctions, e.g., limitations on or losing the ability to proceed in forma pauperis. Cf. Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1981).
For the foregoing reasons, Holly's Motion is DISMISSED as moot and repetitive.