See United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the “decision in Apprendi was specifically limited to facts which increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum and does not invalidate a court's factual finding for the purposes of determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines.”); United States v. Elwood, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20265, at *12 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2024); see also United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that fact finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the sentencing guidelines, need not be made by a jury). Thus, Apprendi does not represent a change in the law that result in a gross sentencing disparity in Petitioner's case.

Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in applying the adjustment. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 416 (5th Cir. 2014).

United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting and citing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (alteration in original)).

United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting and citing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (alteration in original)).

Here, the revised PSR and Addendum sufficiently establish that the full 16.544 kilograms of cocaine were attributable to Rodarte as relevant conduct. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 414-15 (5th Cir. 2014). Rodarte's objection to the dates of the wire intercepts used to determine his role in the conspiracy was resolved by corrections to the PSR in the Addendum.

The plea agreement did not prohibit the Government's arguments that the two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a) was not warranted and that the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) supported the statutory maximum sentence. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014).

Thus, for purposes of determining an offense level, drug quantity does not have to be admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412-13 (5th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, because the sentencing court's determination that Anderson was accountable for 1,081.03 kilograms of marijuana equivalency did not increase the mandatory minimum for his offense, Alleyne has no bearing on Anderson's sentence.

The Government relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Puckett and this court's decision in United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 2014), cases in which the denials of the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction were affirmed because the courts found that the circumstances demonstrated it was "likely [that the defendant] would not have obtained [the] benefits [of the plea agreement] in any event," regardless of any breach. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d at 414 (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142, 129 S.Ct. 1423).

These cases do not apply to facts that increase a defendant's sentencing guidelines range. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “the Alleyne opinion did not imply that the traditional fact-finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the [sentencing g]uidelines, must now be made by jurors”). Further, as in Hinojosa, nothing in the record suggests that Elwood's sentence was the result of the Court's conclusion that a mandatory minimum or statutory maximum applied.

Indeed, we have found there to be no breach in similar circumstances. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding no breach where the plea agreement included no promise from the Government as to drug quantity or what the Government could argue). Carroll has not demonstrated the existence of error, plain or otherwise.