To determine whether a plea agreement was breached we consider 'whether the government's conduct is consistent with the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement.'" United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court of Mississippi has also held that "[q]uestions concerning the construction of contracts are questions of law that are committed to the court rather than questions of fact committed to the fact[-]finder."

Sentencing Tr. at 7. Use of the court's discretion under the sentencing guidelines did not trigger application of Alleyne to movant's case. United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014). V.

Importantly, Alleyne "did not imply that the traditional fact-finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the [Sentencing] Guidelines, must now be made by jurors." United States v. Hinoiosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014).

However, the district court engaged only in factfinding that altered the guidelines range rather than increase the statutory minimum sentence, and, thus, the facts did not have to be admitted by Kates or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163; United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412-13 (5th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, Kates has not shown error, plain or otherwise.

Because Monjaras-Pichardo did not object on this basis in the district court, review is limited to plain error. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014). The district court imposed a sentence within the guidelines range based on relevant conduct, and the facts did not have to be admitted by Monjaras-Pichardo or found by a jury.

Because Hagin did not object on this basis in the district court, we review for plain error only. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014). Hagin does not allege and there is no indication in the record that the district court concluded that a 10-year statutory minimum sentence was applicable in his case. Rather, the district court imposed a sentence within the guidelines range based on relevant conduct, and the facts did not have to be admitted by Hagin or found by a jury.

To determine whether a plea agreement was breached we consider ‘whether the government's conduct is consistent with the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement.’ " United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir.2014). The Supreme Court of Mississippi has also held that "[q]uestions concerning the construction of contracts are questions of law that are committed to the court rather than questions of fact committed to the fact[-]finder."

We review for plain error Felts's claim that, under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), the drug quantity found by the district court based on the presentence report was a fact that should have been found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014). Felts contends that the district court's factfinding effectively raised his statutory minimum sentence from five years to ten and violated the holding in Alleyne. Felts does not allege and the record does not indicate that the district court concluded that a 10-year statutory minimum sentence applied to him.

To determine whether a plea agreement was breached a federal court must "consider whether the government's conduct is consistent with the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement." United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Barnes, 730 F.3d 456, 457 (5th Cir. 2013).

Plain-error review requires the defendant to show “(1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that affected the defendant's substantial rights.” United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir.2014). Then, “[i]f those requirements are met, the reviewing court may in its discretion remedy the error only if it (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”