To determine whether a plea agreement was breached a federal court must "consider whether the government's conduct is consistent with the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement." United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Barnes, 730 F.3d 456, 457 (5th Cir. 2013).

Id. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014). When a defendant challenges the methodology of a sentence calculation, the panel reviews de novo.

But "the Alleyne opinion did not imply that the traditional fact-finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the Guidelines, must... be made by jurors." United States v. Hinoiosa. 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Booker. 543 U.S. 220, 257 (2005)). Indeed, "[a]fter rendering the verdict, the jury's role [is] completed, it [is] discharged, and the judge [begins] the process of determining where within that range to set [a defendant's] sentence."

We review the district court's application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact at sentencing for clear error. United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014). "Issues related to a defendant's sentence are reviewed for reasonableness" using a two-step process: we first "ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error" and then "consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed." United States v. Claiborne, 676 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

"If those requirements are met, the reviewing court may in its discretion remedy the error only if it (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." United States v. Hinojosa , 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014). If the unpreserved error does not meet this demanding plain error standard, the court does not have authority to correct it. Puckett , 556 U.S. at 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423.b. Applicable Law and Analysis

In determining whether a breach occurred, this court decides "whether the Government's conduct is consistent with the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement." United States v. Hinojosa , 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant's subjective belief about the agreement's terms may not constitute a reasonable understanding and may not be sufficient to establish a breach.

Neither Apprendi nor Alleyne applies to sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412–13 (5th Cir.2014). Therefore, his argument is without merit and we find no error.

The district court did not err in conducting its own fact finding for purposes of applying the guidelines cross-reference and determining the guidelines range. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412-13 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005). Second, Samuels contends that the district court's fact finding relevant to the statutory minimum sentence applicable to count 14 violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.

See United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the “decision in Apprendi was specifically limited to facts which increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum and does not invalidate a court's factual finding for the purposes of determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines.”); United States v. Elwood, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20265, at *12 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2024); see also United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that fact finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the sentencing guidelines, need not be made by a jury). Thus, Apprendi does not represent a change in the law that result in a gross sentencing disparity in Petitioner's case.

These cases do not apply to facts that increase a defendant's sentencing guidelines range. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “the Alleyne opinion did not imply that the traditional fact-finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the [sentencing g]uidelines, must now be made by jurors”). Further, as in Hinojosa, nothing in the record suggests that Elwood's sentence was the result of the Court's conclusion that a mandatory minimum or statutory maximum applied.