To establish plain error, "a defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that affected the defendant's substantial rights." United States v. Hinojosa , 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014). The third step of the analysis may be satisfied by showing "a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different."

But "the Alleyne opinion did not imply that the traditional fact-finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the Guidelines, must... be made by jurors." United States v. Hinoiosa. 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Booker. 543 U.S. 220, 257 (2005)). Indeed, "[a]fter rendering the verdict, the jury's role [is] completed, it [is] discharged, and the judge [begins] the process of determining where within that range to set [a defendant's] sentence."

The plea agreement did not prohibit the Government's arguments that the two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a) was not warranted and that the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) supported the statutory maximum sentence. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014).

"To establish plain error, 'a defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that affected the defendant's substantial rights.' " Montemayor, 55 F.4th at 1010 (quoting United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014)). If the first three prongs are satisfied, then the court has the discretion to "remedy the error only if it (4) seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id.

We apply general principles of contract law in interpreting a plea agreement and consider "whether the [G]overnment's conduct is consistent with the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement." United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the language of a plea agreement is unambiguous, we "generally will not look beyond the four corners of the document" to determine the intention of the parties. United States v. Long, 722 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2013).

Regarding Cross' being required to show a clear or obvious error that affected his substantial rights, "the district court need only determine its factual findings at sentencing by a preponderance of the relevant and sufficiently reliable evidence". United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A PSR generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered by the sentencing judge in making factual determinations.

In view of this evidence, it was reasonably foreseeable to Sharp that his codefendants would possess additional quantities of methamphetamine. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 2014). The district court's finding that Sharp was responsible for 43.07 grams of methamphetamine was not clearly erroneous because it was plausible in view of the record as a whole.

We review the district court's application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact at sentencing for clear error. United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014). "Issues related to a defendant's sentence are reviewed for reasonableness" using a two-step process: we first "ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error" and then "consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed." United States v. Claiborne, 676 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

SeeUnited States v. Melquiades , 139 F. App'x 172, 177 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (per curiam) (affirming obstruction-of-justice enhancement where the defendant had denied at sentencing "that he had made post-arrest statements to police officers regarding the weight of the drug shipment, which was relevant conduct," in order to "obstruct or impede his sentencing by denying the quantity of drugs to which he had previously admitted").SeeUnited States v. Baggott , 694 F. App'x 306, 307 (5th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (per curiam) (interviews of defendant's drug suppliers); United States v. Hinojosa , 749 F.3d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 2014) (testimony of confidential informant and federal agent); United States v. Rodriguez , 666 F.3d 944, 947 (5th Cir. 2012) (witness testimony). Barfield also cites United States v. Walter , 683 F. App'x 323 (5th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (per curiam), as an example of a "relevant conduct [finding] based on testimony of law enforcement officer."

As far as this court can tell, and Roe has not cited any precedent to the contrary, every court that has confronted the issue has stated that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea to an indictment which includes a mandatory-minimum-inducing drug-quantity element subjects a defendant to that mandatory minimum sentence. See, e.g., Davis v. United States , 817 F.3d 319, 326 (7th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Caballero , 672 F. App'x 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Jefferson , 791 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2015) ; United States v. Etienne , 772 F.3d 907, 923 (1st Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Hinojosa , 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Bradley , 581 F. App'x 249, 253 (4th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Heard , 561 F. App'x 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Johnson , 732 F.3d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 2013). As these courts have noted, such a rule is entirely consistent with the line of Supreme Court cases that ultimately spawned the decision in Alleyne .