See United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the “decision in Apprendi was specifically limited to facts which increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum and does not invalidate a court's factual finding for the purposes of determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines.”); United States v. Elwood, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20265, at *12 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2024); see also United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that fact finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the sentencing guidelines, need not be made by a jury). Thus, Apprendi does not represent a change in the law that result in a gross sentencing disparity in Petitioner's case.

The plea agreement did not prohibit the Government's arguments that the two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a) was not warranted and that the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) supported the statutory maximum sentence. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014).

"To establish plain error, 'a defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that affected the defendant's substantial rights.' " Montemayor, 55 F.4th at 1010 (quoting United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014)). If the first three prongs are satisfied, then the court has the discretion to "remedy the error only if it (4) seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id.

“[T]he realm of charged conduct and the realm of relevant conduct for Guidelines purposes are not coterminous,” and the Guidelines do not prohibit including as relevant conduct activities that took place when a defendant is a juvenile, provided the activities otherwise meet the test for relevant conduct. United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 415-16 (5th Cir. 2014).

Next, it was not error for the sentencing court to consider additional drug quantities as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that relevant conduct determinations that increase the guidelines range do not have to be found by a jury). Finally, the claim lacks merit because counsel filed objections challenging the drug quantity attributed to Movant as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes.

To establish plain error, "a defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that affected the defendant's substantial rights." United States v. Hinojosa , 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014). The third step of the analysis may be satisfied by showing "a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different."

But "the Alleyne opinion did not imply that the traditional fact-finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the Guidelines, must... be made by jurors." United States v. Hinoiosa. 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Booker. 543 U.S. 220, 257 (2005)). Indeed, "[a]fter rendering the verdict, the jury's role [is] completed, it [is] discharged, and the judge [begins] the process of determining where within that range to set [a defendant's] sentence."

Traditional fact finding on relevant conduct, to the extent that it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the Sentencing Guidelines, does not implicate the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412-13 (5th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Leontaritis, 977 F.3d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 17, 2021) (No. 20-1614). ("We [have] . . . a clean division of labor: . . . sentencing within the statutory minimums and maximums following a guilty verdict and applying the Sentencing Guidelines is for the district judge to decide.").

We apply general principles of contract law in interpreting a plea agreement and consider "whether the [G]overnment's conduct is consistent with the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement." United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the language of a plea agreement is unambiguous, we "generally will not look beyond the four corners of the document" to determine the intention of the parties. United States v. Long, 722 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2013).

Regarding Cross' being required to show a clear or obvious error that affected his substantial rights, "the district court need only determine its factual findings at sentencing by a preponderance of the relevant and sufficiently reliable evidence". United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A PSR generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered by the sentencing judge in making factual determinations.