See United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the “decision in Apprendi was specifically limited to facts which increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum and does not invalidate a court's factual finding for the purposes of determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines.”); United States v. Elwood, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20265, at *12 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2024); see also United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that fact finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the sentencing guidelines, need not be made by a jury). Thus, Apprendi does not represent a change in the law that result in a gross sentencing disparity in Petitioner's case.

The plea agreement did not prohibit the Government's arguments that the two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a) was not warranted and that the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) supported the statutory maximum sentence. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014).

These cases do not apply to facts that increase a defendant's sentencing guidelines range. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “the Alleyne opinion did not imply that the traditional fact-finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the [sentencing g]uidelines, must now be made by jurors”). Further, as in Hinojosa, nothing in the record suggests that Elwood's sentence was the result of the Court's conclusion that a mandatory minimum or statutory maximum applied.

"To establish plain error, 'a defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that affected the defendant's substantial rights.' " Montemayor, 55 F.4th at 1010 (quoting United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014)). If the first three prongs are satisfied, then the court has the discretion to "remedy the error only if it (4) seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id.

Next, it was not error for the sentencing court to consider additional drug quantities as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that relevant conduct determinations that increase the guidelines range do not have to be found by a jury). Finally, the claim lacks merit because counsel filed objections challenging the drug quantity attributed to Movant as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes.

To establish plain error, "a defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that affected the defendant's substantial rights." United States v. Hinojosa , 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014). The third step of the analysis may be satisfied by showing "a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different."

But "the Alleyne opinion did not imply that the traditional fact-finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the Guidelines, must... be made by jurors." United States v. Hinoiosa. 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Booker. 543 U.S. 220, 257 (2005)). Indeed, "[a]fter rendering the verdict, the jury's role [is] completed, it [is] discharged, and the judge [begins] the process of determining where within that range to set [a defendant's] sentence."

We apply general principles of contract law in interpreting a plea agreement and consider "whether the [G]overnment's conduct is consistent with the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement." United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the language of a plea agreement is unambiguous, we "generally will not look beyond the four corners of the document" to determine the intention of the parties. United States v. Long, 722 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2013).

Regarding Cross' being required to show a clear or obvious error that affected his substantial rights, "the district court need only determine its factual findings at sentencing by a preponderance of the relevant and sufficiently reliable evidence". United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A PSR generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered by the sentencing judge in making factual determinations.

In view of this evidence, it was reasonably foreseeable to Sharp that his codefendants would possess additional quantities of methamphetamine. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 2014). The district court's finding that Sharp was responsible for 43.07 grams of methamphetamine was not clearly erroneous because it was plausible in view of the record as a whole.