To determine whether a plea agreement was breached, the court considers "whether the government's conduct is consistent with the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement." United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014). Here, the terms of the written plea agreement provide that Hernandez understood that any estimate he might have received about how the guidelines might be applied to his case was not a promise.

Testimony can support the verdict if it demonstrates that the amount of drugs attributed to the defendant meets the statutory threshold. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 759 F.3d 486, 492-93 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 2014). The jury can find a drug quantity by extrapolating from the testimony.

"If those requirements are met, the reviewing court may in its discretion remedy the error only if it (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." United States v. Hinojosa , 749 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014). If the unpreserved error does not meet this demanding plain error standard, the court does not have authority to correct it. Puckett , 556 U.S. at 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423.b. Applicable Law and Analysis

In determining whether a breach occurred, this court decides "whether the Government's conduct is consistent with the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement." United States v. Hinojosa , 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant's subjective belief about the agreement's terms may not constitute a reasonable understanding and may not be sufficient to establish a breach.

The Government concedes that Gonzalez-Loya meets the standard for plain error and does not oppose remand for resentencing. Cf. United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2014) ("On occasions when the PSR or district court mistakenly applies a higher statutory minimum sentence, resentencing often occurs as a matter of course because the Government concedes the error."). We agree.

See United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the “decision in Apprendi was specifically limited to facts which increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum and does not invalidate a court's factual finding for the purposes of determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines.”); United States v. Elwood, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20265, at *12 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2024); see also United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that fact finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the sentencing guidelines, need not be made by a jury). Thus, Apprendi does not represent a change in the law that result in a gross sentencing disparity in Petitioner's case.

These cases do not apply to facts that increase a defendant's sentencing guidelines range. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “the Alleyne opinion did not imply that the traditional fact-finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the [sentencing g]uidelines, must now be made by jurors”). Further, as in Hinojosa, nothing in the record suggests that Elwood's sentence was the result of the Court's conclusion that a mandatory minimum or statutory maximum applied.

“[T]he realm of charged conduct and the realm of relevant conduct for Guidelines purposes are not coterminous,” and the Guidelines do not prohibit including as relevant conduct activities that took place when a defendant is a juvenile, provided the activities otherwise meet the test for relevant conduct. United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 415-16 (5th Cir. 2014).

Next, it was not error for the sentencing court to consider additional drug quantities as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. See United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that relevant conduct determinations that increase the guidelines range do not have to be found by a jury). Finally, the claim lacks merit because counsel filed objections challenging the drug quantity attributed to Movant as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes.

It is well-established that the district court may consider any information that has sufficient indicia of reliability. United States v. Ramirez, 271 F.3d 611, 612 (5th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that relevant conduct determinations that increase the guidelines range do not have to be found by a jury). Counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file meritless objections.