Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Amanda Beck, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Ramon Herrera, Benjamin D. Galloway, Esq., counsel for defendant Eduardo Salinas-Garcia, Hayes H. Gable, III, Esq., counsel for defendant Fernando Acosta, Shari G. Rusk, Esq., and counsel for defendant Jesus Nunez-Meza, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on September 24, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until December 3, 2015 and to exclude time between September 24, 2015 and December 3, 2015 under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
JOHN R. MANNING, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Sacramento, CA Attorney for Defendant JESUS NUNEZ-MEZA.
BENJAMIN D. GALLOWAY, Attorney for Defendant Ramon Herrera.
HAYES H. GABLE, III, Attorney for Defendant Eduardo Salinas-Garcia.
SHARI G. RUSK, Attorney for Defendant Fernando Acosta.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. Currently, the government has provided 65 pages of discovery as well as three DVDs with numerous videos. Additionally, the defense has requested a significant volume of discovery from the government. The government has indicated they are working on satisfying this request.
b. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.
c. Counsel for the defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of September 24, 2015, to December 3, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A)) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.