Opinion
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE; FINDINGS AND ORDER
ANTHONY W. ISHII, Senior District Judge.
STIPULATION
The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a change of plea or status conference on October 21, 2013 at 10:00 a.m before Senior District Judge Ishii.
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference until November 25, 2013 at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe, and to exclude time between the date of this stipulation and November 25, 2013 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, housed in Lerdo jail in Bakersfield, as plea negotiations continue between Hernandez, Rodriguez and the government following the communication of counter-offers between the parties. The parties anticipate that it is likely they will reach a resolution of the case by November 25, 2013, the date of the proposed status conference, and request the additional time to do so.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, HENRY Z. CARBAJAL III, Assistant United States Attorney, Fresno, CA, Attorneys for the, United States of America.
VICTOR M. CHAVEZ, Counsel for Defendant, JOSE ANTONIO HERNANDEZ.
CARL M. FALLER, Counsel for Defendant, GENARO VELA-RODRIGUEZ.
b. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to November 25, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.