Opinion
CAUSE NO. 3:20-CR-57 DRL
2021-10-07
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Lawrence HANSFORD, Defendant.
Jerome W. McKeever, AUSA, Kimberly L. Schultz, Government Attorneys, US Attorney's Office, South Bend, IN, for Plaintiff.
Jerome W. McKeever, AUSA, Kimberly L. Schultz, Government Attorneys, US Attorney's Office, South Bend, IN, for Plaintiff.
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM
Damon R. Leichty, Judge
After responding to a hostage situation, law enforcement arrested Lawrence Hansford after discovering a shotgun in his camper. His DNA was found on three frequently touched areas of the shotgun. A jury found him guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The court must first calculate the guideline sentence correctly, then decide whether a guideline sentence is the right and reasonable sentence. Nelson v. United States , 555 U.S. 350, 351, 129 S.Ct. 890, 172 L.Ed.2d 719 (2009) ; United States v. Schmidt , 930 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2019). The 2018 sentencing guidelines apply. See Peugh v. United States , 569 U.S. 530, 531, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013) ; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11.
A. The Court Overrules Mr. Hansford's Objection to His Armed Career Criminal Classification.
Mr. Hansford objects to his classification as an armed career criminal under the presentence report [¶¶ 16, 27]. A defendant convicted of unlawful firearm possession with three prior violent felony or serious drug convictions is subject to a statutory minimum sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Mr. Hansford calls this sentence disproportional and unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
Mr. Hansford has at least four qualifying convictions: two felony burglary convictions, a felony conviction for assault (second degree in Kentucky), and felony battery resulting in bodily injury [¶¶ 39, 41, 43, 49]. See United States v. Love , 7 F.4th 674, 681 (7th Cir. 2021) (battery resulting in bodily injury); United States v. Perry , 862 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2017) (burglary); United States v. Maynard , 894 F.3d 773, 775 (6th Cir. 2018) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 508.020 (2002) (requiring intent to cause physical injury); see also United States v. Cardenas , 217 F.3d 491, 492 (7th Cir. 2000). He thus qualifies as an armed career criminal. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). His constitutional argument is foreclosed by United States v. Nigg , 667 F.3d 929, 938-39 (7th Cir. 2012), so the court overrules his objection and applies ACCA.
B. The Court Overrules the Defendant's Objections to Paragraphs 3-9 and 109.
Mr. Hansford objects to ¶¶ 3-9 and 109 of the presentence report that detail the conduct that led to law enforcement's presence on the property. Mr. Hansford says his threats and use of a machete, aside from not occurring, aren't "relevant conduct" under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. He points out that the court excluded these facts in limine before trial.
The court need not decide whether these facts constitute relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 because they have no bearing on his sentencing guideline range. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) & app. n.5(B). Whether the conduct qualifies as relevant conduct to determine his offense level and other guideline adjustments has no bearing on today's sentence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).
That said, the court may consider any reliable information under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), not least concerning Mr. Hansford's history and characteristics. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 ; United States v. Perez , 956 F.3d 970, 976-77 (7th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Roche , 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005) ; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 ; see, e.g., United States v. Love , 680 F.3d 994, 999 (7th Cir. 2012) ("During sentencing, evidentiary standards are relaxed; a sentencing court can consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence as long as the information has a sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.") (internal quotations omitted).
The facts about his machete use and holding the individuals hostage share internal reliability: three witnesses (not just one) verified to law enforcement that Mr. Hansford locked them in the barn with a machete; these actions precipitated the 911 call that drew law enforcement to the scene and to the firearm's discovery; Alex and Alice Glass armed themselves because of these events; Mr. Hansford referenced to law enforcement the disagreement he had "over there" when he was apprehended; later he admitted to law enforcement that he held the machete; and the machete and firearm were found in proximity to each other in the camper.
These facts don't just hinge on Alex Glass's credibility. Even so, the court may utilize information that comes reliably from him. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman , 815 F.3d 347, 354 (7th Cir. 2016) ("a sentencing judge is entitled to credit testimony that is totally uncorroborated and comes from an admitted liar, convicted felon, or large scale drug-dealing, paid government informant") (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Johnson , 489 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2007) ("even the testimony of a potentially biased witness is sufficient to support a finding of fact"); United States v. Zehm , 217 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2000) ("testimony of just one witness, even a potentially biased [fellow drug dealer], is sufficient to support a finding of fact"). In truth, the jury likely credited his testimony in convicting Mr. Hansford, and the court finds his other corroborated reports to law enforcement reliable.
The court overrules the objection accordingly and accounts for this conduct under § 3553(a). The precise nature of any threats has no bearing on his sentence today, so the court overrules that portion of his objection as moot. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).
C. Sentencing Guidelines Calculation.
Having resolved these matters, the court adopts as its findings ¶¶ 1-110 of the presentence report. Mr. Hansford starts at level 24 because he possessed a firearm as a prohibited person after two felony convictions. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). His status as an armed career criminal takes him to level 33. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B) ; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
The sentencing guidelines assess a total of 18 criminal history points against Mr. Hansford for seven previous sentences. His criminal history score and status as an armed career criminal put him in criminal history category VI. U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.4(c), chap. 5A. There the guidelines recommend a sentencing range of 235-293 months, U.S.S.G. chap. 5A, surpassing the statutory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
DISCUSSION
The court decides this sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and Booker v. United States , 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Turning to the statutory factors, the court must arrive at a reasonable sentence: one sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy the statute's purposes. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Mr. Hansford is a danger to the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Lengthy terms of imprisonment have done little to deter, rehabilitate, or promote respect for the law. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B). He has repeatedly violated supervisory conditions, pursued violent crimes, failed to conform his behavior while incarcerated (except thus far here), and abused drugs. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). It seems as soon as he gets out of prison, he goes right back to crime. Predictive measures of his likelihood to recidivate once more—either with firearms or violent crime—prove all too conservative. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) ; see, e.g. , USSC, Length of Incarceration and Recidivism 9 (2020) ("offenders ... who used violence in prior offenses have higher rates of recidivism than offenders who have never used violence in connection with an offense"); USSC, Recidivism Among Federal Firearms Offenders 17 (2019) ("rearrest rate for all firearms offenders was 68.1 percent compared to 46.3 percent for non-firearms offenders").
The guidelines have no category VII, but Mr. Hansford proverbially falls within one. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) ; cf. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1) app. n.2(B). Since turning 18 in 1993, Mr. Hansford has amassed a prolific career of criminal activity—some left uncounted in his criminal history score because of its age (five convictions). This is his third firearms-related offense. He previously shot a man. He has four countable violent felonies (five total) on his record—more than the three needed to qualify as an armed career criminal. His last one occurred at age 33 (2009), but a significant net sentence then, followed by three sentences on probation revocation (for about seven years), and other committed offenses (for sentences of about another year) largely incapacitated him until he returned at age 44 to criminally confine others with a machete and unlawfully possess a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A). Though many of his predicate offenses are older, the gap isn't explained merely as his avoidance of violent crime. He still scores 18 criminal history points. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). His criminal history underscores at minimum the guideline range's reasonableness, not least given its nature and its persistence for more than 25 years. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C) ; see, e.g. , United States v. Cosby , 746 F. Appx. 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming upward variance based on defendant's criminal history); United States v. Jackson , 547 F.3d 786, 793-94 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Melgar-Galvez , 161 F.3d 1122, 1124 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding upward variance for 18 criminal history points and citing cases doing same for 17 and 18 criminal history points). Mr. Hansford would fall deep within category VI regardless of his classification as an armed career criminal.
A guideline sentence tends to militate against any unwarranted sentencing disparities nationally, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) ; United States v. Boscarino , 437 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2006), and Mr. Hansford's criminal history score and his four prior countable violent felonies (five in truth) distinguish him—in aggravating ways—from an armed career criminal who likewise would sit at level 33 or even criminal history category VI, but with three prior violent felonies or a lower criminal history score who nonetheless faces this same sentencing minimum or range. Avoiding unjustifiable disparate sentences belies any argument that the initial benchmark of the guideline range proves unreasonable, see Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 50, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) ; Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 351, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007), but it discards the statutory minimum as a reasonable sentence today, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
Mr. Hansford has anger management issues and other documented mental health challenges. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). He speaks to these challenges in his allocution. Once more he engaged others in anger, with a weapon (machete), over a missing dirt bike. His life has given him few good examples. His father proved absent, and his mother often offered an example of drug addiction and abuse rather than good rearing. He spent significant portions of his childhood institutionalized—juvenile shelters, foster homes, boy's homes, or inpatient care. No one would choose to walk a mile in those shoes, and his journey often left to a young Mr. Hansford the task of raising himself. See id.
Drug use has been a coping mechanism. He had drugs in his camper here too, which the guidelines have not yet considered. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A). He says "people, places and things" trigger an "extreme drug problem." Addiction doesn't occur in a vacuum. At age 7, his mother would make him "shotgun" marijuana and vodka to control his hyperactivity. He used marijuana and methamphetamine daily until his arrest and previously experimented with various other drugs. He attributes some responsibility to his choices. Treatment has been unsuccessful. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Heavy use at a young age and over a long period of time can have enduring cognitive ramifications in adulthood. The principal objectives of criminal punishment that guide federal sentencing—namely retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—must be assessed within the context of significant drug addiction and mental health. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). A heavy-handed sentence will not have the same significant deterrent effect on those with overwhelming drug addiction and mental health issues.
This incident was more than just a temper tantrum, but his offense conduct vis-à-vis the firearm wasn't as egregious as many felon-in-possession crimes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(6). Mr. Hansford didn't brandish or fire the gun. It wasn't stolen. He threatened no one with it. Though angry, he never retrieved or used the firearm in this altercation. He shared possession at times with Alex Glass. When Mr. Hansford had it, the firearm was kept within his camper. He cleaned it. He complied with law enforcement when arrested. At the same time, Mr. Hansford fits the profile of the violence-prone individual that both § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e)(1) were designed to address and designed to rid of any association with firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
Despite the disadvantages he faced during his childhood, Mr. Hansford has completed more education than many individuals this court sees. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). He earned his GED during his imprisonment in 1998. He completed college classes at Ball State University while incarcerated. He took culinary arts, horticulture, and technical design classes through Ivy Tech, an introduction to computer class through Grace College, and participated in an engine repair program through Marysville Tech, obtaining a certificate. Engine repair remains his skill. Education is a powerful sedative to crime—even if it hasn't translated to measurable employment to date and likely won't in older age. See id. Mr. Hansford has rekindled a relationship with his first spouse and has two children. The court hopes, for the sake of both Mr. Hansford and his children, that these relationships continue to grow. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
In addition to considering the federal goals of incapacitation and deterrence, paramount concerns here, the court keeps front of mind the rule of parsimony. A guideline sentence is reasonable, but so is something less; and this rule requires the lower reasonable sentence. Mr. Hansford will be 46 years old in about a week. He faces 15-24 years (statutory minimum to the guideline's high end). Considering a supervised release term, a sentence that accounts for his reduced recidivism risk in his 60s and still promotes just punishment is sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy federal sentencing goals. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B) ; USSC, The Effects of Aging on Recidivism Among Federal Offenders 3, 25 (2017) (for criminal history category VI, recidivism rate for 60 and older is 37.7 percent compared to 64.9 percent for those over age 50) (30.2 percent for firearm offenders over 60). He has had no disciplinary or drug issues while federally incarcerated since July 29, 2020.
Review of all factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) persuades the court that, given the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to provide just punishment and to promote respect for the law, and to deter future such crimes, and given ACCA's operation and the defendant's characteristics, a sentence of 216 months (18 years) is sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy federal sentencing goals.
The court may impose a term of not more than 5 years of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1) ; see U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(1) (recommending 2-5 years). A term of 4 years is appropriate.
Mr. Hansford can't pay the fines recommended by the guidelines even if afforded the most generous of installment payment schedules, so the court imposes no fine. A special assessment of $100.00 is mandatory. 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A).
SENTENCE
Accordingly, it is the court's judgment that the defendant, Lawrence Hansford, is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 216 months.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585, the court leaves it to the Bureau of Prisons to determine the appropriate amount of time served to be credited toward the defendant's sentence, albeit indicating that the defendant should receive credit for time served since his arrest on the related state offense on February 14, 2020.
The court recommends that the Bureau of Prisons designate as the place of the defendant's confinement, consistent with his security classification as determined by the Bureau of Prisons, the federal facility in Terre Haute, Indiana where he may participate in a residential drug abuse program (RDAP) and where he may receive appropriate mental health treatment and vocational training.
Upon release from prison, the defendant will be placed on supervised release for a term of 4 years. While on supervised release, he must comply with the terms of supervision set forth in ¶¶ 111-123 of the presentence report, which paragraphs the court incorporates as part of this sentence having made an independent judgment that they should be imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). The defendant expressly waived reading of these supervisory conditions.
The court imposes no fine. The defendant must pay to the United States a special assessment of $100.00, which is due immediately.
The preliminary order of forfeiture (ECF 70) is made final as to the defendant and included in the judgment. The court will await a motion for a final order as to third-party interests.
SO ORDERED.