Opinion
23-50386
01-10-2024
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 7:12-CR-314-2
Before BARKSDALE, ENGELHARDT, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Proceeding pro se, Robert Michael Handlon, federal prisoner # 34932077, contests the district court's denying his compassionate-release motion made under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (permitting term of imprisonment modification if court finds "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant[ing] such a reduction").
Handlon contends the court erred by: relying on clearly-erroneous facts in its 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing-factor analysis; and finding he failed to assert extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release. Regarding the latter, he asserts he: has been successfully rehabilitated; and currently suffers from medical conditions-including, inter alia, bronchitis-caused by his prior COVID-19 infections. He contends these medical conditions are not being properly treated and could be exacerbated if he were to contract COVID-19 again. Further, he requests our court transfer his proceedings to a different district court.
Review is for abuse of discretion. E.g., United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 2021). "[A] court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Because, as discussed infra, Handlon has not shown the court abused its discretion in concluding he failed to present the requisite extraordinary-and-compelling reasons, we need not reach his claims regarding the court's 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing-factors analysis. See United States v. Jackson, 27 F.4th 1088, 1093 n.8 (5th Cir. 2022) ("[T]he district court may deny [defendant]'s motion without reaching the Section 3553(a) factors if it determines that he has not identified 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' justifying his release".); United States v. Rollins, 53 F.4th 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2022) ("[W]e may affirm if another ground in the record supports [the district court's] judgment". (citation omitted)).
Assuming Handlon adequately preserved this issue, he has not shown the court abused its discretion in rejecting his purported rehabilitation contention. The record shows he was: convicted of assault in prison in 2018; and sanctioned in prison following the assault for, inter alia, possessing a hazardous tool and refusing to obey an order. Additionally, his rehabilitation efforts alone are not an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) ("Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason."); Guideline § 1B1.13 cmt. n.3 (2021) (same); Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 502 (2022) ("[T]he First Step Act does not require a district court to accept a movant's argument that evidence of rehabilitation . . . counsel[s] in favor of a sentence reduction .... All that is required is for a district court to demonstrate that it has considered the arguments before it.").
Further, Handlon has not shown the court abused its discretion in rejecting his medical-condition reason for release because he has not shown he suffers from a medical condition that is a terminal illness or substantially diminishes his ability to provide self-care while in prison. E.g., United States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 433-35 (5th Cir. 2021) (rejecting medical-condition contention). Moreover, he has: contracted COVID-19 without severe complications; received the COVID-19 vaccine and at least one booster; and his prison reported no COVID-19 infections at the time his motion was considered. See United States v. Rodriguez, 27 F.4th 1097, 1099101 (5th Cir. 2022) (concluding court did not abuse its discretion "by deciding the conditions at [defendant]'s prison and his medical conditions were insufficiently compelling and extraordinary to entitle him to relief"). His apprehensions about COVID-19 do not justify relief. See id.; Thompson, 984 F.3d at 435 ("Fear of COVID doesn't automatically entitle a prisoner to release.").
Finally, Handlon requests our court to reassign his proceedings to a different district court judge. His request is unavailing because he has not shown the court reversibly erred in denying his compassionate-release motion. E.g., Johnson v. Harris County, 83 F.4th 941, 947 (5th Cir. 2023) (denying request for reassignment because no reversible error); United States v. Stanford, 883 F.3d 500, 516-17 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting reassignment standard is "a high hurdle").
AFFIRMED. The request for reassignment is DENIED.
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.