We have held that a negative response to a judge's generic wrap-up question at sentencing is ordinarily not construed as a waiver. United States v. Hancock, 825 F.3d 340, 343-44 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Morris, 775 F.3d 882, 886 (7th Cir. 2015). Waiver is the intentional surrender of a known right, and nonspecific concluding questions from the judge-like "anything else?"-are normally too general to trigger waiver.
Before we address the argument, we repeat our advice that at the end of every sentencing hearing, the court should specifically ask whether it addressed sufficiently the defendant's main arguments in mitigation. See United States v. Hancock , 825 F.3d 340, 343–44 (7th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Donelli , 747 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Garcia-Segura , 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2013) (encouraging courts to ask "whether [defendants] are satisfied that the court has addressed their main arguments in mitigation" and if they assent, "a later challenge ... would be considered waived"). This approach allows courts to correct possible procedural errors immediately, while their thinking is fresh, rather than wait for "correction after appellate review, a year or more of delay, and a new hearing after remand."
Under this standard, to require discussion the arguments must be "individualized to the facts" of the movant's case. See United States v. Hancock , 825 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2016). We do not decide that we must always review claims of procedural error from denials of motions for compassionate release under the same standard as claims of procedural error at sentencing.
A judge must "meaningfully" consider the defendant’s principal arguments, but that requirement "does not apply mechanically." United States v. Hancock , 825 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 2016), quoting United States v. Estrada-Mederos , 784 F.3d 1086, 1091 (7th Cir. 2015). The district judge discussed the studies that Grisanti cited about recidivism and the reasons he argued that he was unlikely to offend; the explanation was sufficient.
These arguments, however, would go nowhere on appeal. District courts are permitted to disagree with the sentencing policies advanced by the Guidelines, but they are not required to do so. See United States v. Oberg, 877 F.3d 261, 263-64 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Hancock, 825 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2016). And we have rejected the argument that the Guidelines' enhancements for child pornography improperly double count conduct.
The judge engaged with Ferguson’s mitigating argument; he referred to the scientific evidence about young brains and the Supreme Court’s boundaries on sentencing juveniles. He could have expressed less disdain for those boundaries, but he was entitled to disagree. See United States v. Hancock , 825 F.3d 340, 345 (7th Cir. 2016). He reasonably concluded that the mitigating factor of youth was outweighed by the nature of the offense, the impact on the victim, Ferguson’s long and growing criminal history, his misdeeds while in custody, and his evident lack of remorse.
That it could sentence Campbell leniently did not compel it to do so. See United States v. Hancock, 825 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that a sentencing judge need not address an argument that is "not individualized to the facts"). In any event the court implicitly rejected Campbell's argument for a sentence of one day on the robbery count.
" Id . Moreover, the district court "was perfectly entitled to accept the penal philosophy embodied in the current fraud guideline and was not obligated to explain why [it] chose to do so." Id . ; see also United States v. Hancock , 825 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Schmitz for the proposition that a district court need not address Hancock's policy argument that "the Guidelines' offense-level increases for receipt, transport, possession, or distribution of child-pornography, fit poorly with modern practical realities" and specifically reiterating that "the district judge was ‘perfectly entitled to accept the penal philosophy embodied in the current [child-pornography] guideline’ " (alteration in original)).Like the district courts in Schmitz and Hancock , here the district court was "perfectly entitled to accept the penal philosophy embodied" in the Guidelines that societal goals are served by increasing fraud sentences to reflect the amount of loss, as opposed to imposing only nominal sentences.