Opinion
CASE NO. 1:12-cr-00242 AWI-BAM
05-09-2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CRYSTAL DAWN GRAY, Defendant.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney HENRY Z. CARBAJAL III Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for the United States of America JANET BATEMAN Counsel for Defendant CRYSTAL DAWN GRAY
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER
United States Attorney
HENRY Z. CARBAJAL III
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for the
United States of America
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE
STATUS CONFERENCE; FINDINGS
AND ORDER
DATE: June 3, 2013
JUDGE: Hon. Anthony W. Ishii
STIPULATION
The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on May 13, 2013 at 1:00 p.m. before U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 3, 2013 at 10:00 a.m. for a change of plea hearing before U.S. District Judge Anthony W. Ishii, and to exclude time between the date of this stipulation and June 3, 2013 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv). The government does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes over 1,000 pages of discovery, including investigative reports, bank records and related documents. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time in preparation of this case. The parties have tentatively reached a plea agreement. Counsel for the defendant and defendant desire additional time to execute the plea agreement and prepare for a change of plea hearing.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to June 3, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence. IT IS SO STIPULATED.
____________________
HENRY Z. CARBAJAL III
Assistant United States Attorney
____________________
JANET BATEMAN
Counsel for Defendant
CRYSTAL DAWN GRAY
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Barbara A. McAuliffe
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE