See also United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 108, 105 S.Ct. 611, 612 (1985) (per curiam) (31 U.S.C. § 1058, 1101); United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994) (2 U.S.C. § 431-454, 455(a)); United States v. Parsons, 967 F.2d 452, 456 (10th Cir. 1992) ( 26 U.S.C. § 7207); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1299-1300 (2d Cir. 1991) ( 15 U.S.C. § 78ff); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 943-49 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (2 U.S.C. § 706); United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 1982) (31 U.S.C. § 1058, 1101); United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743, 744-45 (8th Cir. 1977) ( 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn); United States v. Burnett, 505 F.2d 815, 816 (9th Cir. 1974) ( 18 U.S.C. § 1919). In Beer, the defendant was convicted of violating § 1001 for failing to list an outstanding loan on a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") questionnaire.

It does not matter that the government decides to invoke a general statute when a more specific criminal statute is available. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 565-66 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 108 (1985) (per curiam); United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43, 46 (1952); United States v. Parsons, 967 F.2d 452, 456 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 218 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Carter, 526 F.2d 1276, 1278 (5th Cir. 1976)); United States v. Derezinski, 945 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1991). Thus, the government could have pursued a conviction in this case under the "defraud" clause of 18 U.S.C. § 371 alone, without ever bringing a charge for the more specific offenses of structuring or conspiracy to structure and without ever referencing 31 U.S.C. § 5322.

Our decision that the ESA and the Agriculture statute do not repeal by implication the applicability of § 545 to Mitchell's conduct is in accord with the majority of cases dealing with repeal by implication in the context of a later enactment providing a lesser penalty for the same conduct subject to greater punishment under an earlier statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 943-49 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that later enactment of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, providing civil penalty for violations, did not repeal by implication the applicability of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 1976), providing for felony punishment, to fraudulent financial disclosure report); United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 1977) (later enactment of statute providing misdemeanor penalty for Medicare fraud did not preclude felony prosecution under § 1001); United States v. Burnett, 505 F.2d 815, 816 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (holding later enactment of statute providing misdemeanor penalty for false statements to obtain unemployment benefits for prior federal service did not preclude felony prosecution under § 1001), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 966, 95 S.Ct. 1361, 43 L.Ed.2d 445 (1975); Roseman v. United States, 364 F.2d 18, 24-27 (9th Cir. 1966) (finding that later enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938, which provided misdemeanor penalty for violations, did not repeal by implication the applicability of § 545 to the importation of inadequately labelled LSD), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 879, 880, 17 L.Ed.2d 789 (1967); United States v. Kushner, 135 F.2d 668, 670-71 (2d Cir.) (finding that later enactment of the Gold Reserve Act did not repeal by implication the application of the

Similar holdings in other circumstances can be found in opinions by the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 108, 105 S.Ct. 611, 612, 83 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (per curiam) (proof of currency reporting offense did not preclude proof of section 1001 violation); United States v. Parsons, 967 F.2d 452, 456 (10th Cir. 1992) (false statements to Internal Revenue Service could be prosecuted either under section 1001 or specific provisions of the Internal Revenue Code); United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1977) (false statements to obtain Medicare payments could be prosecuted under either specific criminal statute or section 1001); United States v. Carter, 526 F.2d 1276, 1278 (5th Cir. 1976) (either section 1001 or specific criminal provision is applicable to offense of false statements on loan applications); see also United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43, 46, 73 S.Ct. 77, 79, 97 L.Ed. 61 (1952) (false statements made for purpose of evading taxes punishable under specific provision of Internal Revenue Code or under section 1001). In sum, an examination of the legislative history of the Election Campaign Act and its amendments uncovers no express evidence that the Act was intended to preempt the general criminal provisions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b), 371, or 1001.

Prosecution has additionally been permitted under § 1001 despite the existence of other overlapping and more specific false statement statutes. United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 1977); see also, e.g., United States v. Grotke, 702 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1983) (§ 1001 applicable despite more specific currency reporting statute.). Defendant argues that in the case of alleged misstatements or omissions in informational reports filed under the Exchange Act, Congress planned that § 32(a) and not § 1001 control.

A district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence on remoteness grounds only will be reversed for an abuse of discretion. Cf. United States v. Amaro, 816 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 1961, 95 L.Ed.2d 532 (1987). We do not think that, under these specific circumstances, the district court abused its discretion here. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 1977) (where defendant podiatrist charged with making false statements for the purpose of obtaining Medicare payments claimed to have performed excision and removal of toenails, and evidence established that a toenail takes eighteen to twenty months or longer to grow back, photographs of feet of alleged patients taken four to six months after alleged excision and removal were relevant to corroborate a witness's testimony). As the district court pointed out, moreover, the remoteness issue in this case goes more to the weight to be given to the evidence, and not to its admissibility.

The rule in this circuit is clear that "prosecution under section 1001 is permissible even in view of other overlapping and more specific false statements statutes." United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 1977). "[W]hen an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants."

. See also, e.g., United States v. Fern, 696 F.2d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 1983) (false statements made to an IRS auditor could be prosecuted under either § 1001 or a specific provision in the Internal Revenue Code); United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1977) (false statements to obtain medicare payments could be prosecuted under either § 1001 or a more specific criminal statute); United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 567-68 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820, 97 S.Ct. 68, 50 L.Ed.2d 81 (1976) (same); United States v. Carter, 526 F.2d 1276, 1278 (5th Cir. 1976) (false statements in connection with Small Business Administration loan applications could be prosecuted under either § 1001 or a specific criminal provision governing the loan applications). Hansen also discerns implied repeal in a difference between 2 U.S.C. §§ 706 and 704.

With regard to Exhibit 1, we note that "[l]ike other matters of relevancy, the use of photographs is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 1977). The surveillance photographs were relevant to show appellants' physical association with each other and with locations where gambling activity was carried on. They were corroborative of the surveillance testimony, and, when taken with other evidence, were probative on the issue of illicit association, a predicate for invocation of the coconspirator rule.

(Citations omitted). To the same effect see, United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43, 73 S.Ct. 77, 97 L.Ed. 61 (1952); United States v. Carpenter, 611 F.2d 113 (5 Cir. 1980); United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743 (8 Cir. 1977); United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556 (10 Cir. 1976); United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771 (5 Cir. 1975); United States v. Burnett, 505 F.2d 815 (9 Cir. 1974); United States v. Chakmakis, 449 F.2d 315 (5 Cir. 1971); United States v. Eisenmann, 396 F.2d 565 (2 Cir. 1968). Fern next questions the materiality of the statements made by him to Wilson.