Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, MEGAN A. S. RICHARDS, Assistant United States Attorney, Fresno, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
DALE BLICKENSTAFF, Counsel for Defendant, Edgar Alexander Gomez.
AMONICA BERMUDEZ, Counsel for Defendant, Jennifer Grace Barthel.
JOHN MEYER, Counsel for Defendant, Augustine Castro Salazar.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 17, 2015 at 1:00 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until August 31, and to exclude time between August 17, 2015 at 1:00 p.m., and August 31, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to conduct investigation, review discovery, and allow for counsel for Edgar Alexander Gomez, Dale Blickenstaff, to be available at the next hearing.
b) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c) The government does not object to the continuance.
d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 17, 2015 at 1:00 p.m. to August 31, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.