This court and others have found no discrepancy in written supervision conditions that use different language to impose substantially identical requirements. See, e.g. , United States v. Thomas , 830 F. App'x 420, 423–24 (5th Cir. 2020) ("[W]hen the pronouncement explicitly refers to the condition, despite wording it differently[,] ... no conflict results."); United States v. Buchanan , 820 F. App'x 401, 405 (6th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Gaynor , 530 F. App'x 536, 542 (6th Cir. 2013) ; Lewis , 565 F. App'x at 498. Booker identifies two unpublished decisions where we found a written supervised release condition to conflict with the conditions announced at sentencing.
(Id. at 20-21.) See also United States v. Gaynor, 530 F. App'x 536, 541 n.4 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a district court can consider "rehabilitation when imposing a term of supervised release"). Wise's argument, instead, "ultimately boils down to an assertion that the district court should have balanced the § 3553(a) factors differently."
Although this court has vacated a drug treatment condition where drug use had no relation to any of the offenses in the indictment, United States v. Frazier, No. 12-3887, 2013 WL 6224032, at * 5 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2013), Darden had numerous prior offenses involving controlled substances, several officers testified that Darden admitted that the drugs found in his vehicle belonged to him, and Darden had participated in a substance-abuse program while incarcerated. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); United States v. Gaynor, 530 F. App'x 536, 540-41 (6th Cir. 2013). Considering the evidence as a whole, the district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Darden to submit to periodic drug testing at his probation officer's discretion.