United States v. Gallagher

3 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Burrows

    905 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2018)   Cited 13 times
    In Burrows, the district court explained that the sentence would be "sufficient... to address the harm" and to give the defendant "time to avail [him]self of the sex offender treatment as an adult."

    There is "no indication that the district court chose the length of the sentence based upon the greater opportunities for rehabilitation a longer prison sentence allowed." Seeid. ; cf.United States v. Gallagher , 526 F. App'x 658, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[W]hile the district court's statement demonstrates that it sincerely hopes that [the defendant] receives treatment while in prison, the statement does not establish that the district court imposed or lengthened [the defendant's] prison sentence in order to ensure that she received treatment."). Indeed, it appears the court determined the length of Burrows's sentence, in its words, "to address the seriousness of the offense and also [the] concerns about [Burrows's] risk to recidivate and the need for general deterrence.

  2. United States v. Krul

    774 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 2014)   Cited 25 times
    Noting that Tapia "cannot mean that reversal is required whenever it is merely possible that rehabilitation drove the length of imprisonment"

    Moreover, every other circuit that has decided the issue has chosen to review unpreserved Tapia claims for plain error, consistent with Henderson.See, e.g., United States v. Del Valle–Rodriguez, 761 F.3d 171, 174 (1st Cir.2014); United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir.2014); United States v. Wooley, 740 F.3d 359, 368 (5th Cir.2014); United States v. Lifshitz, 714 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir.2013); United States v. Pickar, 666 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir.2012); United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 200 (4th Cir.2012); United States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 279 (9th Cir.2011); United States v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103, 1105 (10th Cir.2011). See also United States v. Godoy, 706 F.3d 493, 496 (D.C.Cir.2013) (declining to decide the question); United States v. Gallagher, 526 Fed.Appx. 658, 661 (7th Cir.2013) (assuming, without deciding, that plain error applied). To the extent that Deen—relying upon this court's pre- Gall and pre- Henderson practice—suggested a result different than that reached by every other circuit that has considered the issue, Henderson has placed its approach in serious peril.

  3. Schmier v. United States

    Case No. 16-CV-590-NJR (S.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2018)

    These acknowledgements make clear that the Court referenced Schmier's addiction and need for treatment in order to express its concern that Schmier was likely to commit further crimes unless and until her addiction issues were fully under control, and therefore, a term of imprisonment was needed to incapacitate Schmier and to protect the public. This is a valid basis for imposing a prison sentence and does not violate Tapia. United States v. Kubeczko, 660 F.3d 260, 262-63 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gallagher, 526 F. App'x 658, 663 (7th Cir. 2013). With respect to the third comment, the context shows that the Court mentioned the various treatments that Schmier needed for the purpose of addressing the availability and adequacy of the care that she would receive while in prison.