Opinion
4:21-CR-12
07-22-2021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ELIJAH RAYMOND ENGRAM
ORDER
DEBRA M. BROWN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Elijah Raymond Engram is charged with one count of cocaine possession with intent to distribute and one count of felony possession of a firearm. Doc. #1. On June 28, 2021, Engram filed a motion to suppress evidence and statements obtained through a no-knock search of his residence. Doc. #19. Engram argues that the affidavit supporting the no-knock search warrant was insufficient to support a no-knock entry. Id. at 4. This Court concludes that even if the affidavit could be deemed insufficient to justify a no-knock warrant, suppression would not be warranted.
“The Fourth Amendment incorporates the common-law principle that officers must knock and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry of a dwelling.” Bishop v. Arcuri, 674 F.3d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 2012). This rule “has been [a] part of federal statutory law since 1917 and is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109.” United States v. Bruno, 487 F.3d 304, 305 (5th Cir. 2007). However, in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006), the United States Supreme Court “held that suppression is not the appropriate remedy for a violation of the constitutional knock-and-announce requirement.” Bruno, 487 F.3d at 305. It is also not an appropriate remedy for violation of § 3109. Id. at 306-07 (collecting cases). Rather, “the key remedy for unjustified no-knock entries is an action under § 1983 for money damages.” United States v. White, 990 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Hudson); see United States v. Briggs, 347 Fed.Appx. 750, 753 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A]s to Briggs' claim that the agents that executed the search warrant of his home violated the knock-and-announce rule, even assuming that they did so, suppression would not be appropriate.”).
In contrast, the “exclusionary rule requires courts to suppress evidence seized on the basis of a warrant that is unsupported by probable cause.” United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). “Probable cause exists when there are reasonably trustworthy facts which, given the totality of the circumstances, are sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that the items sought constitute fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime.” Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1109 (5th Cir. 2006).
Notably, a challenge to whether an affidavit supported a no-knock warrant is not a challenge to the existence of probable cause for the warrant itself. United States v. Rigaud, 684 F.3d 169, 176 (1st Cir. 2012). Because Engram's motion challenges only the sufficiency of the no-knock portion of the warrant, rather than whether probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant itself, the exclusionary rule does not apply. Accordingly, the motion to suppress [19] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED