Since the SBA was merely acting as the servicing agent, the government argues that the lien was not that of the SBA. In support of that argument the government cites two cases which considered § 646 in light of facts similar to those in this appeal and rejected it as inapplicable: United States v. Maes, 316 F. Supp. 1267 (D.Colo. 1969); United States v. Dyna-Tex., Inc., 372 F. Supp. 278 (D.Tenn. 1972). Both courts concluded that since the source of the funds was not the SBA, the interests created were not those of the SBA, making § 646 inapplicable.
An involuntary petition in bankruptcy has been filed against it. The debtor has allowed judgments against him to stand unsatisfied for more than 30 days.Ideco v.Chance Drilling Co., 422 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Dyna-Tex, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 278 (E.D.Tenn. 1972); United States v. Williams, 139 F. Supp. 94, 97-98 (M.D.N.C. 1956). The statute is therefore applicable to the instant case.
The court disapproved two district court decisions on which respondent relies. ( United States v. Maes (D.Colo. 1969) 316 F. Supp. 1267; United States v. Dyna-Tex, Incorporated (E.D.Tenn. 1972) 372 F. Supp. 278.) We are in complete agreement with U.S. v. California-Oregon Plywood, Inc., supra, both on the merits of its view of section 646 and because it deals, like the present case, with California real estate taxes.