Allowing a modicum of common sense to enter into the analysis, we agree with the First and Eighth Circuits on this point. This problem is distinguishable from another common sentencing mistake, where a district court fails to specifically note whether multiple sentences are to be served concurrently or consecutively. See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 310 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 938, 83 S.Ct. 1542, 10 L.Ed.2d 693 (1963). In that instance there is no statute requiring sentencing courts to take one path or the other; so we construe silence in favor of the defendant and impose concurrent sentences unless the record contains clear evidence that everyone understood the sentences to be consecutive.

The Supreme Court held that the filing requirement had been satisfied. Similarly, in United States v. Duncan, 310 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 938, 83 S.Ct. 1542, 10 L.Ed.2d 693 (1963), an indigent prisoner sent a letter expressing a desire to appeal to one of the judges within the ten-day period. Again, the filing requirement was found to have been satisfied.

The magistrate relied on Scott v. U.S., 434 F.2d 11, 20 (5th Cir. 1970), for the proposition that where there is a "mere ambiguity" in the oral sentencing, as opposed to a "conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment," it is proper to look to the record and to the written judgment to ascertain the court's intention. Finding the case of U.S. v. Duncan, 310 F.2d 367 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 938, 83 S.Ct. 1542, 10 L.Ed.2d 693 (1962), "strikingly similar," he concluded that Schurmann was not entitled to relief. Though we reject the government's argument that it is clear from the record of the sentencing hearing that the judge intended a consecutive sentence, we agree with the magistrate and district judge that it is appropriate in these circumstances to look to the written order as evidence of the sentencing judge's intent and that Schurmann's § 2255 motion should therefore be denied. Schurmann correctly observes that it is the law of this circuit that "`[a]bsent clear language to the contrary, it is presumed that sentences imposed on more than one offense at the same time, or at different times, will run concurrently.' (emphasis added)."

A letter written by an indigent prisoner within the time for appeal informing the trial court of a desire to appeal may be regarded as sufficient to constitute the taking of an appeal. . ..United States v. Duncan, 310 F.2d 367, 368 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 938, 83 S.Ct. 1542, 10 L.Ed.2d 693 (1963) (citations omitted). In Duncan a letter dated February 19, purporting to be a notice of appeal from an order entered on February 12, was not received by the district court until February 26. Nevertheless, it was held to be jurisdictionally sufficient.

"A letter written by an indigent prisoner within the time for appeal informing the trial court of a desire to appeal may be regarded as sufficient to constitute the taking of an appeal although it does not comply with all of the technical niceties ordinarily governing a notice of appeal." United States v. Duncan, 310 F.2d 367, 368 (7 Cir., 1962). We suggested in that opinion, at page 368, that any such letter must contain sufficient information to constitute it a substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 37. * * *

Williams at the plenary hearing held by the trial court at the direction of this court on April 19, 1968, for the first time presented what he asserted to be a copy of a letter written by him from the jail to the presiding judge, which he testified he had delivered to an attendant at the city jail for mailing on May 7, 1964, the date the copy of the letter bears. The Government concedes that a timely letter to the judge or clerk stating defendant's desire to appeal may serve as a notice of appeal. See Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 84 S.Ct. 1689, 12 L.Ed.2d 760; Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed.2d 21; Howard v. United States, 8 Cir., 396 F.2d 867; United States v. Duncan, 7 Cir., 310 F.2d 367. It is also conceded that the purported letter is sufficient in form to constitute a notice of appeal. The Government takes the position that the original of the letter, of which a copy was produced, was not in fact either written or mailed at any time prior to the expiration of the time for appeal from the conviction.

United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960).E.g., United States v. Duncan, 310 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 938, 83 S.Ct. 1542, 10 L.Ed.2d 693 (1963); Blunt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 266, 244 F.2d 355 (1957); Boykin v. Huff, 73 App.D.C. 378, 121 F.2d 865 (1941). "The obvious purpose of section 405 is to afford the Commission an opportunity to consider and pass upon matters prior to their presentation to the court."

Moreover, a contention that the judgment “was ambiguous, indefinite and equivocal” does not afford a basis for relief under this Rule. See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 310 F.2d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 1962). B. Motion to Reconstruct the Record

Moreover, a contention that the judgment "was ambiguous, indefinite and equivocal" does not afford a basis for relief under this Rule. See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 310 F.2d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 1962). B. Motion to Reconstruct the Record

Accord, Byrd v. United States, 345 F.2d 481 (10 C.A. 1965). See also Baca v. United States, 383 F.2d 154 (10 C.A. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 929, 88 S.Ct. 868, 19 L.Ed.2d 994 (1968); United States v. Duncan, 310 F.2d 367 (7 C.A. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 938, 83 S.Ct. 1542, 10 L.Ed.2d 693 (1963). Defendant's final contention, i.e., that his sentence is invalid because the period of probation exceeds the maximum possible sentence, is likewise without merit.